“Here’s what the law says on the matter.”
A child born out of wedlock is a non-marital child or an illegitimate child. Article 176 of the Family Code “explicitly grants the sole parental authority to the mother [of an illegitimate child], notwithstanding the father’s recognition of the child.” (Spouses Gabun v. Stolk, G.R. No. 234660, June 26, 2023 citing Masbate v. Relucio, 2018)
“In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother’s unfitness to exercise such authority and care” (G.R. No. 234660).
“In case of the death, absence, or unsuitability of the parents or the mother in the case of illegitimate children, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent [or the one designated by the court]” (Article 214, Family Code).
“In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the [following] order:
(1) The surviving grandparent…; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.” (Article 216, Family Code)
“Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed” (Article 216, Family Code). “[I]t would appear that substitute parental authority is granted to the grandparents or the specified persons only in case of death, absence, or unsuitability of both parents.”
“[H]owever, [where] the parental authority is granted solely to the mother as in the case of illegitimate children, the substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the grandparents or the specified persons…, in case of the mother’s death, absence, or unsuitability.” “[T]o read otherwise would effectively permit circumvention of the legislative intent to grant sole parental authority to the mother with respect to their illegitimate children” (G.R. No. 234660).
It does not mean that “the father of illegitimate children [is] automatically and absolutely [disqualified] from exercising substitute parental authority in case of the death, absence, or unsuitability of the mother… [I]n fact, … the father of an illegitimate child may exercise substitute parental authority and be given custody in situations where he is the ‘child’s actual custodian, as provided under Article 216 of the Family Code’” (G.R. No. 234660).
In the case of Spouses Gabun v. Stolk, “Winston Clark Stolk, Sr. (Stolk) filed a Verified Petition for Habeas Corpus against [Spouses Gabun], praying for absolute and permanent custody over his minor son, Winston Clark Daen Stolk, Jr. [Stolk, Jr.]. [Stolk] claimed that he and Stolk, Jr.’s mother, Catherine Alfonso Daen (Catherine), lived together as husband and wife for more than four years in Florida, United States of America (USA) but without the benefit of marriage.”
When Catherine returned to the Philippines in 2007 to give birth, “[she] died a few hours after giving birth to [Stolk, Jr.]…, leaving the latter in the care of [the Gabun spouses],… who appear to be [Stolk, Jr.’s] actual custodians and collateral grandparents, being the sibling of [Stolk, Jr.’s] biological grandparents.”
“[Stolk even] asserted that [the Gabun spouses] knew that he would be coming to the Philippines to take care of everything, including the custody of [Stolk, Jr.], but when he arrived, [Spouses Gabun] prohibited him from seeing his child. Further, [Stolk] claimed that [Stolk, Jr.’s] birth certificate indicated him… as the latter’s father” (G.R. No. 234660).
“[I]n all questions involving the care and custody of minors, it is axiomatic that their welfare and well-being is always the paramount consideration. For this reason, Section 14 of the Rule on Custody of Minors enumerate[s] factors that must be considered in determining the issues of custody.”
“These [factors] include: the child’s material and moral welfare, health, and safety; the nature and frequency of contact with both parents; habitual use of alcohol, dangerous drugs, or regulated substances; the most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological, and educational environment for the holistic development and growth of the minor; and the preference of the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit” (G.R. No. 234660).
“In this case, it is undisputed that Catherine was not married to [Stolk]. Thus, the sole parental authority, including custody, over her illegitimate son, [Stolk,Jr.], resided with her pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code. Upon Catherine’s death, the collateral grandparents of [Stolk, Jr.] took actual custody of the latter and exercised parental authority over him…”
The Supreme Court said that “there is undeniably an apparent dearth of supporting reasons in the trial court’s ruling with respect to the existence of such facts, circumstances, and conditions that is most congenial for [Stolk, Jr.’s] survival, protection, and feelings of security encouraging his physical, psychological, and emotional development.”
“Indeed, the RTC ruling [against the Gabun Spouses] failed to consider such factors enumerated in Section 14 of the Rule on Custody of Minors as the ‘health, safety and welfare of [Stolk Jr.],’ the ‘habitual use of alcohol, dangerous drugs or regulated substances [by Stolk],’ [and] the most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment for [Stolk, Jr.’s]…” (G.R. No. 234660).
