The estate of the deceased

The individual seeks to accumulate wealth to perform his duty of service to the members of his family.

The knowledge that, upon his death, the products of his efforts and his work will be enjoyed by the objects of his affection furnishes the greatest incentive to his initiative, industry and thrift (Tolentino, Succession).

In Common Law, “succession is an attempt to express the family in terms of property.”

“It was but natural, therefore, that the property and succession should be the points at which the family sought most eagerly to preserve its stability and safety” (The Concise History of the Common Law).

The law on succession is thus based partly on the law of family relations, and partly on the law of property (Tolentino, Succession citing 5 Valverde 8).

“As Sanchez Roman says: ‘I firmly believe that even in primitive society, successional right… had for the basis of its existence not only the organization of property…, but also the institution of the family” (Tolentino, Succession).

Disputes may arise in the determination of what constitutes the estate of the deceased. For instance, if there is a question on the title of a property, it should not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding; that question should be ventilated in a separate action (Romero v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. 188921, April 18, 2012).

“As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality.

“Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title” (Pacioles v. Ching, G.R. 127920, August 9, 2005).

However, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership “if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties’ consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties [is] not impaired” (G.R. 188921, April 18, 2012; Aranas v. Mercado, et al., G.R. 156407, January 15, 2014).

In the case of Romero v. Court of Appeals, et al., Leo and Amando claim their brother Vittorio succeeded in fraudulently registering several properties to his name through Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora, the latter being the administrator of the estate of their deceased father (G.R. 188921, April 18, 2012).

Hence, Leo and Amando filed a complaint for annulment of sale against Aurora and Vittorio.

The trial court in dismissing the case held that “the case could not be adjudicated… without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate court (another pending action) as to the share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate” (G.R. 188921, April 18, 2012).

In the same decision dismissing the case, the trial court also declared that even the claim of the mother, Aurora, that some of the properties being claimed by the plaintiffs are paraphernal (properties exclusively owned by the wife), is an issue which must be taken up and established in the intestate proceedings (G.R. 188921, April 18, 2012).

“The Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court”… [T]his is… within [its] jurisdiction which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent…” (G.R. 188921, April 18, 2012 citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals).

In simpler words, the case is not really one of title or ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be included in the inventory of the estate, as “only the probate court can competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate” (G.R. 188921, April 18, 2012).

In Pacioles v. Ching, respondent Ching’s (mother of the deceased Miguelita) purpose “was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted… to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate” (G.R. 127920, August 9, 2005).

The Supreme Court said the Regional Trial Court, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction when it allowed the determination of Respondent Ching’s claim.

The intended “day in court” or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of the respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate (G.R. 127920. August 9, 2005).

“[I]t is well-settled… that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance… but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate[;] such [a] question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.”

In the case of Aranas v. Mercado, et al., the administrator, Teresita (second wife of deceased Emigdio) submitted an inventory indicating that at the time of death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 consisting of cash, furniture and fixtures, pieces of jewelry, and shares of stocks of Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson (G.R. 156407, January 15, 2014).

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma (daughter of Emigdio from his first marriage) moved for the RTC to direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it.

The RTC granted Thelma’s motion.

The RTC ordered Teresita to re–do the inventory of properties which are to constitute the estate of Emigdio and then to submit the revised inventory within 60 days from notice thereof.

The Court also directed her to render an account of her administration of the estate (G.R. 156407, January 15, 2014).

Can the RTC direct the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

The answer is in the affirmative.

“Upon [the issuance] of the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance” (G.R.156407, January 15, 2014).

Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory (G.R. 156407, January 15, 2014).

It is worth remembering that “[O]ftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds” (G.R. 127920. August 9, 2005).

These acrimonious disputes must be avoided to keep the peace among those who were left behind.