The Marriage Certificate was a common exhibit, having been offered in evidence by both the prosecution and defense
The provision “provides that the prosecution is allowed to use an evidentiary presumption to negate a defense or prove an element of the crime charged only if the following conditions are met: (l) the basic fact is proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the presumed fact follows from the basic fact beyond reasonable doubt.”
“A presumption is an evidentiary tool where the basic fact furnishes a substitute for the presumed fact and relieves the offeror of the burden to produce evidence to prove the fact presumed.
“It has the effect of shifting the burden to the adverse party to ‘go forward’ with evidence, and unless there is counterproof or positive evidence to the contrary, the presumption ‘controls [the] decision on the presumed fact’.”
“In the case at hand, the basic fact is the Marriage Certificate between Rommel and Maricar, while the presumed fact drawn or inferred therefrom is that the second marriage has all the essential and formal requisites for its validity.
“Clearly, the prosecution is using an evidentiary presumption to prove an element of the crime charged against Rommel, warranting the application of the foregoing rule of procedure.”
“[T]he Court finds that the basic fact, i.e., the Marriage Certificate between Rommel and Maricar, from which the presumed facts on the essential requisites of the second marriage are to be inferred from, has been established beyond reasonable doubt…
“ [T]he existence and authenticity of the Marriage Certificate between Rommel and Maricar was admitted by the defense at the pre-trial stage.”
“Even more, the Marriage Certificate was a common exhibit, having been offered in evidence by both the prosecution and defense. Given the judicial admission of the Marriage Certificate, the prosecution no longer needs to present evidence on this matter.
“Indeed, to determine whether the prosecution has discharged the burden of proof, the Court may consider all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court…”
“Nonetheless, it must be clarified that Rommel’s admission on the authenticity and existence of the Marriage Certificate only means that there is no longer any issue that the document exists, that it was signed by Rommel voluntarily, that the copy on record is the same document that was signed by Rommel, and that the document is what it purports to be, i.e., a correct copy of the original in the custody of the PSA.”
“The admission does not extend to the truth of the contents of the Marriage Certificate, especially those which were specifically denied by Rommel. Hence, despite his admission, Rommel is not precluded from arguing that the contents of the Marriage Certificate on the solemnities observed for the second marriage are inaccurate.” (To be continued)