Chill lang

The title of this article is addressed both to the Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian, at the same time to those among us who reacted so sharply against him and his remarks before the 8th Manila Forum sponsored by an NGO which calls itself the Association for Philippines-China Understanding (APCU).

Riled at what he and his government consider to be provocative actions of our government against his country, specifically in approving three new locations in northernmost Luzon for use by the American military as part of our EDCA executive agreement under the VFA, the ambassador unleashed statements which were considered not only “undiplomatic,” but viewed as “threatening.”

Consistently insisting the China-Taiwan problem is “internal” and “interference” by other countries, specifically the US and its military allies, as “provocations,” the ambassador told his audience that:

“The Philippines is advised to unequivocally oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ rather than stoking the fire by offering the US access to the military bases near the Taiwan Strait if you care genuinely about the 150,000 OFWs.”

Spoken like a true “wolf warrior” diplomat, which our countrymen viewed as undiplomatic and even insulting, to the point where Sen. Risa Hontiveros asked the envoy be sent back to Beijing, the remarks stirred a hornet’s nest in a country which for years has been resentful of Chinese incursions in the West Philippine Sea.

(Incidentally, the current Chinese ambassador is due for replacement within the year, assuming the usual protocols of diplomatic assignments are followed.)

The mere fact that we adhere to the “One China policy” should mean that we, along with the overwhelming majority of nations around the globe save for 13, do not support Taiwan independence.

What was interpreted as threatening was when he added the phrase “if you care genuinely about the 150,000 OFWs” in Taiwan.

We fully understand China’s reading of our agreement to use three locations just a few hundred kilometers from the southern part of Taiwan as aimed at potential utilization in the event the US “interferes” in what China considers as an “internal” matter for which they “will not renounce the use of force.”

As lawyers would say “res ipsa loquitor,” the locations chosen speak for itself.

But why insert “if you care genuinely about” our overseas workers and other Filipino citizens residing in Taiwan, which should by now be around 185,000 more or less?

In Christian Esguerra’s podcast “Facts First” where I was the guest last Monday, 17 April, I said maybe the ambassador (or his speechwriter), thinking in Mandarin, translated into English the point he wanted to bring up the wrong way.

Poor choice of words for a diplomat, indeed.

I am more understanding though, because having served as chairman and resident representative of our country to Taiwan from 2016 to 2021, I and two other ASEAN country representatives were worried about contingency measures to protect our citizens in Taiwan should hostilities erupt.

After all, the number of contract workers from our three ASEAN countries had by then reached 700,000 and counting.

It is obvious that if China “invades,” it will want to do so as surgically as possible, which means their fighter jets will target the seaports, airports and other major transport networks in the island which has a territory, mostly mountainous, of less than 10 percent of the entire Philippines.

How then could our de facto embassies assure the safety of each citizen, protecting them from becoming casualties of a war to which our countries are not involved?

Still, we were able to draft an emergency plan together with Vietnam and Indonesia, with the hope we would never have to use it.

The nearest seaport which we could use because of its proximity to Batanes would be Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s busiest and one of the world’s biggest.

To bring 185,000 Filipinos from scattered areas in Taiwan to Kaohsiung would be a most difficult endeavor, especially if the seaport has become a target of bombs, and the railway system is too dangerous to use.

Most of Taiwan’s airports double up for military use, and, therefore, flying out such a number would be both a financial and logistical nightmare.

In Ukraine, there were land corridors to Poland, Romania and other parts of Europe. In Libya, our embassy staff hired buses to bring our OFWs to neighboring Egypt.

Taiwan is an island, surrounded by the potential theaters of war in the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel which separates our north from their south.

MECO even put up a reserve fund for contingency, started during the term of my predecessor, the late Amadito Perez of respected memory, and increased in my time precisely for use if conflicts made it necessary to secure the lives and welfare of our citizens in Taiwan.

The best we could really do is hope that the island’s many bomb shelters could accommodate our citizens, especially in the likely target areas, and we could at the very least feed them, a difficult undertaking in times of war.

The assumption, not too far-fetched, is that if China “invades,” its current economic problems notwithstanding, it will be a short war, not because the Taiwanese will not fight to defend themselves, but because of a host of other considerations, whether the invading forces do not want to inflict harm against their “cousins” or to avoid international pressure, even armed intervention by the US and allies.

If it becomes like Ukraine, which has succeeded in prolonging valiant struggle against Putin’s Russia, then evacuation of our citizens would be a must.

That aspect of “concern” was what Ambassador Huang should have stressed, not the simplistic “if you care genuinely” reminder which sounded insulting.

Then again, the comparison between Taiwan as an “internal affair” and our problems in Muslim Mindanao was both unfortunate and ill-advised.

Is not Xi Jinping and his government offering a 12-point plan to put an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

And did not China successfully bring about a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia just recently?

Whatever is wrong with a foreign country offering its good offices to mediate in conflicts which could escalate and more and more lives could be lost?

And whatever is wrong if a sovereign country accepts such assistance?

That is what the international “community” of nations is all about.

In several articles in this space, this writer has stated a negative view of the expansion of EDCA, specifically our agreeing to additional sites which are not to enhance security of our western seaboard, where the WPS/SCS conflict continues to rankle.

In fact I was aghast when in 2018, in a MECO-DTI sponsored investment conference in Taipei where one of the ecozone presenters from the Cagayan Export Processing Zone (CEZA) proudly showed a made-in-China visual of CEZA territory being leased to a PRC based corporation, before an audience of Taiwanese businessmen.

And I recall my having expressed to the powers-that-be at the time my apprehension over such, including the potential conflict it could trigger with not only Taiwan but the US with which we had a military alliance.

As far as I know, that venture has not come to fruition.

Which is the same reason why assigning Lal-lo Airport, San Vicente and Gamu in northeastern Luzon may in fact hasten a PRC decision to attack Taiwan.

In our April 10 article in this space (Taiwan crossroads 2024) I wrote about the forthcoming January 2024 elections in Taiwan which would determine who takes over as president, and from which mainstream party, when President Tsai-Ingwen completes her two terms in office by May 2024.

Between then and now, and I pray I am right, we should chill lang.

Sure there will be acoustics of warfare every now and then, depending on developments and “US interference” as the China labels these.

But until the crucial elections gives us a reading of the directions Taiwan’s government will take vis-à-vis Xi Jinping’s “re-unification,” these could just be a case of muscle-flexing and nerve-intimidating exercises.

What the international community should do is use its influence and goodwill in getting the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities which after all, does neither China nor Taiwan’s economy any good, even if it makes the military-industrial complex profit from more arms sales.