(Part 1)
I initially thought I was lucky to have been able to access a copy of the lengthy summary of the 121-page Mamasapano Report. But sometimes ignorance can be bliss. Reading it turned out to be a tough act as I could not help being overcome with strong feelings of regret, sadness and anger for the loss of the lives of the 44 SAF 44 commandos. The tragedy could have been averted had there been a more adequate analysis of the area of operation, an understanding of the character of the various rebel groups inhabiting the area, better planning, efficient coordination, support in artillery and better communication equipment. And, lest I miss it, had there been a better state of leadership in the mission to arrest high value targets such as terrorist.
I will resist making my own conclusions any further. I will be presenting in two installments in this column excerpts and the most salient findings of the Mamasapano Report and leave you to form your own opinion.
• Based on the report, Oplan Exodus was approved by President Benigno S. Aquino and implemented by suspended Chief PNP Purisima and the Director of SAF Getulio Napeñas. The goal was to neutralize high value targets who were international terrorists, namely: Zhulkifli Bin Hir/Zulkifli Abhir (Marwan), Ahmad Akmad Batabol Usman (Usman), and Amin Baco (Jihad).
• Napeñas and Purisima ignored the established PNP Chain of Command by excluding OIC-PNP Espina in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. Napeñas and Purisima also failed to inform the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, Mar Roxas, about Oplan Exodus, and made no prior coordination with the AFP.
• The participation of suspended PNP Chief Purisima in Oplan Exodus was carried out with the knowledge of the President. Purisima and Napeñas met with the President several times and communicated with him via SMS regarding the execution of Oplan Exodus on January 25, 2015.
• Purisima failed to deliver his assurance that he would coordinate with the AFP. At a crucial stage in the crisis, Purisima provided inaccurate information from an unofficial source, which further jeopardized the situation of the 55th SAC and 84th Seaborne in Mamasapano.
• Napeñas chose to employ a “way-in/way-out, by foot and night-only” infiltration and exfiltration concept of operation. He admitted that key variables for the success of Oplan Exodus, such as the coordination with the Sixth Infantry Division of the AFP, the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group were not thoroughly considered in the mission planning. The established protocols and Standard Operating Procedures of the AFP, the Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group in providing reinforcement and effecting ceasefire were not sufficiently discussed.
• Napeñas proposed to the President the adoption of the “Time-On-Target” concept of coordination for Oplan Exodus which meant that the disclosure of information to a limited number of persons would be withheld until the target is engaged. Napeñas’ primary consideration for adopting the concept, which was shared by Purisima, was operational security because some AFP men had intermarried with locals. The President was informed about the adoption of the Time on Target concept for Oplan Exodus but remained silent.
• One of the survivors, Police Superintendent Raymund Train of the 84th SAC attested that, in case of heavy enemy fire, the first planned mitigating action for Oplan Exodus was indirect artillery fire support from the AFP. The second planned mitigating action was the commissioning of the peace process mechanisms to facilitate ceasefire.
• However, Napeñas failed to consider that the Time on Target strategy would make the planned mitigating actions unachievable because the AFP and the Joint Action Group on Ceasefire were not informed of the operations until the hostilities had ensued
• Napeñas appeared to have relied heavily on the verbal commitment of suspended PNP Chief Purisima that he would arrange for the needed AFP support. Had Napeñas himself coordinated with Brig. Gen. Carlito Galvez about the plan to resort to the peace process mechanisms if a fire fight intensifies, he could have learned that, based on past experiences, a ceasefire can
only be achieved after at least six (6) hours of negotiation. At the time the AFP was informed, however, a hostile encounter between the SAF Commandos and various armed groups in Mamasapano had already ensued. There was also no plan for close air support.
• During the site survey in Mamasapano on February 24, 2015, the PNP Board of Inquiry chaired by Director Benjamin Magalong, observed the unfavorable terrain faced by the reinforcing troops. The wide terrain between their location and that of the 55th SAC was literally flat without adequate cover and concealment. Tactical maneuvers, such as the “Bounding Overwatch” technique, would have been difficult and may have resulted in more casualties. According to the platoon leaders, enemy fire was coming from all directions which prevented them from maneuvering and reinforcing the 55th SAF.
To be continued this week
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