When this essay was submitted for publication, the four disqualification cases filed against Senator Grace Poe, a candidate for president in the May 2016 elections, remained unresolved in the Supreme Court. Without the gift of prophecy, a writer cannot predict precisely when that will happen. Meanwhile, a press deadline must be met.
At any rate, the disqualification cases filed against Poe have become emotionally charged for Poe critics and allies. Those who seek Poe’s disqualification have invoked the mandate of the 1987 Constitution that only natural-born Filipino citizens, and those who have been residents of the Philippines for at least 10 years prior to the election, are qualified to run for president. Having run out of valid legal arguments, Poe’s supporters have resorted to extra-constitutional and highly emotional appeals—foundlings like Poe should not be discriminated against, and that the voters should decide Poe’s qualifications at the ballot box, even if that means an outright violation of the Constitution.
Poe isn’t president yet, and she already disregards the Constitution. One can only imagine what Poe will do to the Constitution if she does become president.
The social media are awash with speculation from the public about how the justices of the Supreme Court will decide the disqualification cases against Poe. Some believe that the three justices who ruled against Poe in the separate disqualification case filed against her before the Senate Electoral Tribunal are not expected to change their minds, and that from the way the hearings went, two more justices seem to share their view. Others say that three other justices appear sympathetic to Poe’s cause inasmuch as these justices disapprove of both the way the 1987 Constitution has been worded, and its supposed inexcusable failure to protect foundlings like Poe against discrimination—views that suggest a judicial amendment of the charter, which is a proposition frowned upon in Constitutional Law.
While many commentaries are properly supported by legal doctrines and principles, the opposing views are mere emotional arguments devoid of support in either the Constitution or in existing legislation.
Nonetheless, there is a distinction between a lay person and a justice of the Supreme Court. A lay person is entitled to express his or her own opinion, no matter how insignificant, incorrect or radical, or even if the opinion is incompatible with the Constitution. The justice, on the other hand, does not enjoy that liberty. Under the established rules, where the case involves an unavoidable constitutional question, the justice must resolve the case on the basis of what the Constitution provides, and not on the basis of what the justice personally thinks or feels by way of emotion and sympathy. The Supreme Court, after all, is a court of law. It is not a charitable institution or a welfare agency like the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office where appeals anchored on emotion and sympathy are often made.
Indeed, courts in the Philippines are both courts of law and courts of equity, but equity must yield when the law, especially the fundamental law of the land, is clear and explicit. Moreover, where the law is clear, compliance, not judicial interpretation, is the correct course of action.
The proposition that the Supreme Court is both a court of law and a court of justice is a needless distinction. Justice may temper the law, but if justice is invoked when the law is bent or violated simply to suit a particular individual, it ceases to be justice. It becomes injustice in its baldest form because nobody is above the law, especially where the law concerned is the Constitution.
A number of citizens using social media are unsettled by the possibility that some justices of the Supreme Court will resolve Poe’s disqualification cases not on the grounds set forth in the Constitution, but on grounds manifestly outside of the constitutional realm, such as emotional sympathy for foundlings. Some citizens warn that to do so will invite prospects for impeachment. They cite Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution, which provides that a justice of the Supreme Court may be impeached and removed from office for, among others, culpable violation of the Constitution or betrayal of the public trust.
To warrant impeachment, the violation of the Constitution must be culpable or deserving of blame. Possible examples of culpable violation of the Constitution may include a deliberate or whimsical misreading of the provisions of the charter, or the use of a whimsical rule or inconsistent standard as to when a provision of the charter should be treated strictly or liberally. Since the Constitution itself states that public office is a public trust, and considering that all court decisions should be arrived at judiciously, a capricious or constitutionally untenable court ruling or vote qualifies as a betrayal of the public trust.
Evidently, there will be a need to establish that a justice who bases his vote on Poe’s disqualification cases on a ground that is not warranted under the Constitution actually committed a culpable violation of the Constitution or a betrayal of the public trust.
The Constitution also provides that a verified impeachment complaint may be initiated by a member of the House of Representatives, or by a citizen whose complaint is endorsed by a member of the House. Impeachment by the House only means that the corresponding complaint has been filed with the Senate. Therefore, once the public officer concerned is impeached by the House, a trial automatically ensues in the Senate. If the public officer is acquitted by the Senate, then he stays in office. On the other hand, conviction by the Senate results in his ouster from office.
In May 2012, Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona, a controversial appointee of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was ousted from office after his conviction in his impeachment trial. Corona’s impeachment was initiated by President Benigno Aquino III, a political foe and the successor of President Arroyo.