Enhancing the ‘Quad’ security dialogue and fostering multilateral discussions on regional security could help mitigate risks
In the shadowy corridors of global geopolitics, a provocative assertion by Matthew Pottinger, a former top US national security adviser, reverberates like a distant thunderclap.
Speaking at the Heritage Foundation, Pottinger declared China’s recent provocations in the South China Sea, particularly its aggressive stance against the Philippines, are a “dress rehearsal” for a more ominous conflict: an attack on Taiwan.
This assertion carries the weight of historical precedence, strategic calculus, and the ever-present specter of a broader confrontation.
Pottinger’s projection
Pottinger’s argument is not without merit.
Historically, great powers have often tested their adversaries in smaller theaters before launching larger campaigns.
The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) served as a prelude to World War II, where Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy honed their military tactics.
Similarly, the Korean War (1950-1953) was a proxy battleground for Cold War tensions, setting the stage for later confrontations.
Strategically, the Second Thomas Shoal, while not a significant geostrategic location on its own, offers China a probing ground to demonstrate its capabilities and resolve.
By targeting this “tiny model of Taiwan,” Beijing can assess the reactions of the United States and its allies, calibrate its military strategy, and refine its tactics for a potential blockade or invasion of Taiwan.
Pottinger’s call for US support to resupply Filipino marines on the shoal underscores the necessity of signaling to Beijing that such maneuvers will not go unchecked.
Furthermore, Pottinger’s advocacy for a more robust mutual defense response aligns with the logic of deterrence.
The US-Philippines defense treaty, one of five in the Indo-Pacific, is designed to deter aggression through the promise of collective defense.
By demonstrating a willingness to enforce this treaty, the US could dissuade China from escalating its provocations, not just in the South China Sea but also towards Taiwan.
Challenges to Pottinger’s claims
However, there are compelling counterarguments that challenge Pottinger’s projection.
Historically, not all conflicts serve as preludes to larger wars.
The Falklands War (1982) between Argentina and the United Kingdom did not precipitate a broader conflict despite initial fears. The localized nature of some disputes can remain just that—localized.
Strategically, China’s actions in the South China Sea could be interpreted as a means of consolidating regional dominance rather than rehearsing for a larger conflict.
Beijing’s primary aim might be to assert its claims over disputed territories and resources, which is a longstanding goal rather than a stepping stone to an invasion of Taiwan.
The incremental approach to expanding influence in the South China Sea might not necessarily translate to a full-scale military operation against Taiwan, given the latter’s vastly different strategic and logistical challenges.
Moreover, engaging in direct military support for the Philippines could escalate tensions unnecessarily.
Historical precedents like the Vietnam War illustrate the perils of entangling alliances and the potential for local conflicts to draw in superpowers with disastrous consequences.
The principle of proportionality in international relations suggests a measured response—diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and regional coalitions—might be more effective and less risky than immediate military intervention.
Strategic actions
Assessing Pottinger’s projection requires a balanced view of both historical precedents and current geopolitical realities.
His argument that China’s actions in the South China Sea are a rehearsal for Taiwan is plausible but not conclusive.
The strategic and historical contexts provide both support and caution for such a stance.
Pottinger’s call for a more assertive US response should be tempered with diplomatic finesse.
The US should indeed reinforce its commitments to allies like the Philippines to deter Chinese aggression, but this should be coupled with sustained diplomatic efforts to engage Beijing.
Enhancing the “Quad” security dialogue and fostering multilateral discussions on regional security could help mitigate risks.
At the same time, the US must avoid provocations that could escalate into unintended conflicts.
A calibrated approach that combines military readiness with diplomatic overtures is essential.
The Biden administration’s mixed messages on AI negotiations with China highlight the need for coherent and consistent policies that address both competition and cooperation.
In conclusion, while Pottinger’s projection of China’s actions as a dress rehearsal for Taiwan raises valid concerns, a balanced strategy of deterrence and diplomacy is paramount.
The US and its allies must navigate these turbulent waters with a keen eye on history, strategy, and the overarching goal of regional stability.
The stakes are high, and the path forward demands both vigilance and restraint.