Close on the heels of recent run-ins between the Philippine military and Chinese Coast Guard/maritime militia vessels in disputed territory in the South China Sea, there’s now a proposal to set up a direct communication line between the top diplomats of the two countries to prevent any escalation of maritime disputes.
Such a ‘hotline’ is something that should have been put in place years ago, particularly after the Philippines won a favorable ruling from the Permanent Arbitral Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS.
The trouble is that Beijing has refused to honor the arbitral award, adamant in its stand that it owns practically the whole of the vital sealane on the basis of what it calls its historical right under the so-called “nine-dash line.”
The imaginary “nine-dash line” is what’s behind the frequent tense stand-offs between the two sides in the high seas.
The details of the proposed hotline will still have to be ironed out when President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. embarks on a three-day state visit to China starting tomorrow.
According to our Department of Foreign Affairs, both sides have already agreed to sign an agreement establishing direct communication between the foreign ministries of both countries at various levels to “avoid miscommunication and miscalculation in the West Philippine Sea” that could lead to unintended consequences.
The agreement will be signed by our Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. It will be one of over a dozen deals to be sealed during the state visit.
While at this, however, we must ask whatever happened to the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) that the two sides established at the start of the previous administration to thresh out issues and concerns related to the South China Sea?
We recall that the late Ambassador to Beijing Chito Sta. Romana headed our side in the first of the BCMs in 2017.
The BCMs held no more than three to four face-to-face meetings until COVID-19 struck in early 2020 and disrupted what was planned to be bi-annual meetings alternately in Beijing and in Manila.
As far as we know, the BCMs have issued official communiqués after each meeting.
But no details of the discussions have been divulged by either side beyond glittering generalities, and what specific issues have been actually resolved.
Otherwise, the frequent stand-offs in the South China Sea would have been avoided by this time, six years after the fact.
That raises the question: Have the BCMs been totally useless in resolving key issues in the South China Sea and makes the proposed hotline between our respective foreign affairs departments a mere exercise in futility?
