Fidel V. Ramos was elected President of the Philippines in 1992 (and served for the Constitutionally mandated period of six years) and Rodrigo Duterte has just been elected President and should serve for the same number of years. Both ran in elections contested by the highest number of Presidential candidates in the political history of this country (seven in 1992 and five in 2016). Both were elected with less than a majority of the total number of votes cast in the 1992 and 2016 elections: 24 percent in Ramos’s case and 38 percent in Duterte’s.
There the similarity between the two men ends. In fact, the two men—the man they called (and still call) Tabako and the man they call Digong—could not be more different from one another.
President-elect Ramos went out of the 1992 election campaign and into the Presidency without leaving behind hurt feelings, bruised egos and battered friendships (except, of course, that of then-Presidential candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago, who to this day claims that she was cheated). This is not the case with President-elect Duterte.
Duterte entered the campaign like the proverbial bull in a china shop and exited like one. He cussed (Pope Francis, among others), insulted (the ambassadors of the US and Australia and fellow-candidate Mar Roxas, among others) and badmouthed his way to the campaign finish-line. All of the victims of Rodrigo Duterte’s mouth have indicated a willingness to forget. But forgiving and forgetting are two different things, and I am prepared to wager that all of the President-elect’s victims are unlikely to forget.
In short, Fidel V. Ramos went into his electoral campaign, and exited from it, as a decent and respect-deserving person. The same cannot be said of the 2016 President-elect.
When he launched his candidacy for the Presidency in January 1992 FVR clearly was prepared for the enormous responsibilities of the nation’s No. 1 post. An engineer by virtue of his training at the Philippine Military Academy and the US Military Academy, FVR had three distinct achievements by the time he entered Malacanang: he had served as a combat officer in the Korean War, he had been the nation’s top policeman during the entire martial law period (1972-1986) and he had helped steer the EDSA Revolution to victory over the overwhelming military and police forces loyal to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Being a son of a National Assemblyman and Secretary of Foreign Affairs—the late Narciso Ramos—FVR was steeped in national politics and foreign affairs at the time he took the Presidential oath of office. He ended his pre-Malacañang public career as the Secretary of National Defense.
When he is sworn into office on June 30, Rodrigo Duterte will, by contrast, be far less qualified to assume the responsibilities of the Presidency. He had a forgettable stint as a public prosecutor after graduation from law school. His single term as member of the House of Representatives is not memorable. Indeed, Rodrigo Duterte’s only claim to fame is as the Dirty Harry-type chief executive of Mindanao’s largest city. No experience with international diplomacy. Very little experience in economic and social policymaking at the national level. And certainly no experience with managing anything bigger than a city police and budget.
Yet another instance of contrast between President-elect Ramos and President-elect Duterte.
Still another point of difference between pre-inauguration FVR and President-elect Duterte has manifested itself since Commission on Elections figures began to show that Rodrigo Duterte had defeated Mar Roxas by a margin of more than 6 million votes. That point is the process of putting together a Cabinet. By the time it became clear that he was the winner in the seven-candidate contest, FVR had already thrown around in his mind the individuals whom he wanted to tap for specific Cabinet positions—after all, after decades of national-level public service he had met countless businessmen, professionals and government executives—discussed national issues with them and had them quietly vetted to avoid possible appointment problems. Shortly after the election, FVR already had decided who he wanted to be his secretary of foreign affairs, secretary of national defense, secretary of finance and so on. Because of his personal knowledge and the careful vetting that had been done upon his instructions, none of FVR’s first appointees raised eyebrows or generated or elicited opposition. On their first day in office, FVR and his Cabinet were able to hit the ground running, in keeping with the new President’s military background.
By contrast, Rodrigo Duterte’s construction of his Cabinet can best be described as an ill-prepared and unsystematic patchwork. Every new appointment by the President-elect seems to be tentative or to be the result of a political accommodation or a desire to be surrounded by classmates and close Davao City friends. The appointment to the Public Works and Highways secretaryship of the son of one of this country’s leading real estate developers—now being roundly criticized—would never have happened in FVR’s day.
From Day One FVR was conscious of the fact that 76 percent of the voters had not voted for him. He realized that being voted into office by only one out of every three voters deprived him of the right to be reckless, wasteful or insensitive in the use of his newly acquired power. For that reason he exercised utmost care in his decision-making, especially about the composition of the Cabinet.
This appears to be not the case with President-elect Duterte. He talks and acts like he were elected by 62 percent of the voters rather than the other way around.
A tale of two plurality Presidencies. A tale of two successes? Or of one successful and one likely-to-fail Presidency?
E-mail: rudyromero777@yahoo.com
