Oral arguments in the disqualification cases lodged against Senator Grace Poe, a candidate for president in the May 2016 elections, will be heard by the Supreme Court today. By now, anyone monitoring the cases must be aware of the arguments.
One argument raised in favor of Poe needs to be discussed. Since the argument relies on the 1935 Constitution, or more specifically, what is not in the said charter, a brief discussion of the background of the 1935 charter may be necessary.
In early 1935, the 1934 Constitutional Convention completed a draft charter for the anticipated Philippine Commonwealth. The draft was eventually approved by President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, and later ratified by the Filipino people in a nationwide plebiscite. Upon its ratification, the draft charter became the 1935 Constitution of the Commonwealth and, in 1946, the Republic of the Philippines.
The 1935 Constitution is silent on the citizenship of foundlings discovered within Philippine territory.
Poe’s lawyers and allies argue that in the course of the proceedings of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, a couple of delegates raised a query regarding the citizenship of a foundling discovered within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Convention delegate Manuel Roxas is credited with the remark that such foundling is presumed to be the child of Filipino parents under the civil law, and that since foundlings were rare in 1934, and for reasons of style, that observation need not be categorically stated in the text of the charter they were drafting. From this premise, the Poe camp sweepingly concludes that the intention of the 1935 Constitution is to consider a foundling in Philippine territory a natural-born citizen of the country.
The argument is fallacious.
If that was what Delegate Roxas had in mind, why didn’t he insist on its inclusion in the text of the 1935 Constitution? There was nothing stopping him and other delegates similarly minded from doing so. Instead, these delegates chose to remain silent about it. The mere fact that foundlings were rare in the Philippines in 1934 does not excuse the delegates’ silence and inaction.From these premises, therefore, it may be reasonably postulated that what the 1934 Constitutional Convention did not include in the 1935 Constitution must be deemed excluded from it.
Moreover, it is not clear if the Roxas remark was subjected to a vote during the proceedings of the convention. If no affirmative vote was taken, then the Roxas remark is inconclusive, a mere comment which binds nobody.
In the construction of the provisions of the Constitution, the Supreme Court ruled in 2000 that what is controlling is not the intention of the delegates of the convention that framed it, but the interpretation given to it by the Filipino people who ratified it. After all, the 1935 Constitution became the supreme law of the land, not because the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention wrote it, but because it was ratified by the people as such. Thus, a constitutional convention can propose anything, but its proposals are not binding without the approval of the people.
Since the so-called Roxas remark never saw print in the text of the 1935 Constitution when it was submitted to the people for their ratification, then it is manifestly unfair and unjust to bind the people to something which was not stated in the charter itself. To insist otherwise is akin to forcing a contracting party to comply with an inexistent stipulation in the contract he entered into. It is also like changing the rules of the game in the middle of the match, or getting a written warranty with the fine print invisible.
Like its predecessor, the 1973 Constitution is silent on the citizenship of foundlings. Since several delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention which drafted the 1973 charter were experts in Constitutional Law, they must have been aware of the salient points in the proceedings of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, as well as the silence of the 1935 Constitution on the citizenship of foundlings. If the Roxas remark meant anything at all, the delegates would have given it some attention. The fact that the 1973 Constitution does not even mention anything about foundlings suggests that the Roxas remark was deemed immaterial by the delegates who framed it.
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is considered the martial law-era Constitution has nothing to do with the silence of the charter on the citizenship of foundlings. There is likewise no valid basis to brand the 1973 Constitution as a pro-Marcos charter. Ex-president Diosdado Macapagal, an arch rival of President Ferdinand Marcos, was the president of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. When the draft charter was completed in 1972, Macapagal himself went to Malacañang Palace to deliver it to Marcos.
Actually, the focus of the legal debate regarding Poe’s citizenship should not be the 1935 Constitution (even though Poe was born when it was in force), but the 1987 Constitution which states who may and may not be president of the Republic—the high public office Poe seeks in May 2016.
Like the 1935 and 1973 charters, the 1987 Constitution is silent on the citizenship of foundlings. The 1987 Constitution was drafted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission, an assembly composed of unelected individuals hand-picked by then-President Corazon Aquino. There is nothing in the records of this commission which indicates if its members were even aware of the Roxas remark. Since there were also several experts in Constitutional Law in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it appears very likely that the Roxas remark was also considered immaterial by this constituent assembly.
In sum, the Roxas remark was conspicuously missing in the 1935 Constitution, and disregarded and ignored by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. In addition, the Roxas remark was never ratified by the people. Under these circumstances, it is unthinkable how and why the Roxas remark should apply to the disqualification cases against Poe.