We saw it in 1992. Virtually 85 percent of all the politicos were with Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino . Yet its candidate Monching Mitra lost, a poor fourth in a field of seven big- name candidates. FVR had a ragtag team instantly grouped under Lakas-NUCD, and Miriam had virtually no machinery whatsoever.
We saw it again in 1998. Exit LDP, and whatever remained of it allied with Erap Estrada’s minuscule Partido ng Masang Pilipino. The sitting president was FVR of Lakas-NUCD. Everyone and his mother had deserted LDP but for Angara and a few others, and moved to Lakas. Joe de Venecia was the Lakas candidate and the incumbent’s chosen. He was a far number two to Erap, who garnered 40 percent of all votes cast in a field of seven nationally known candidates.
It was sheer popularity versus machinery though in 2004, the difference being that the machinery was run by a sitting president who came to power after ousting the elected Erap in 2001. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo squeaked through to victory, with a little help from Garci to make the margin reach “more than a million” over the movie king FPJ. The latter’s downfall was largely attributed to bad “handling” and the inability to unite with other opposition candidates.
In 2010, it was a popular message mouthed by the son of a recently deceased former President that trounced the money (and presumably machinery) and the come-backing popularity of a former president. And the endorsee of the incumbent though unpopular president did not appeal to the voters. Gibo Teodoro, despite his sterling qualifications, finished a poor fourth.
Will the machinery work for Mar Roxas this time? He has the endorsement of a sitting president whose personal popularity, though dimmed, is still comparatively high. He presumably, no, obviously has the money. His Liberal Party has grown from being a Volkswagen Kombi in 2000 to a Coaster in 2009 to a long convoy of several air-conditioned buses in 2016.
In the last SWS survey released Friday last week, Roxas’ numbers were statistically tied with Poe and Duterte. Binay, his sworn nemesis, the “scorned” antithesis of Mar and PNoy’s “daang matuwid,” is leading with 31 points over Poe’s declined 24, Mar’s 21, and Duterte’s 20.
True, the January survey results are but a “snapshot.” But it is a critical snapshot. If the numbers to be released soon by Pulse Asia more or less confirm the same, they set the psychological tone for the campaign which begins in three weeks.
At the end of January 2010, PNoy who had an awesome 54 in October, had scaled down dramatically to 36. Villar, meanwhile, clambered up to 34, a statistical tie. Erap and Gibo were trailing far behind. But in the heat of a 90-day campaign, PNoy’s 36 held on, and by end-March, was slowly recovering. Villar’s 34 started dropping, most of his numbers migrating towards Erap. Gibo’s did not register, and his vaunted machinery sputtered. In the end, PNoy got some 43 percent of the total vote; Erap 28 percent.
The problem with the “machinery” is that it is so easy to crumble. First, the Constitution of 1987 unwisely adopted a multi-party system in a presidential form of government. Incompatible.
Second, turncoatism has become accepted political practice. Unido in 1985; LDP in 1990; Lakas after 1992; Lammp and PMP in the wake of Erap’s spectacular win, only to go pffft right after he was ousted, and Lakas became “the” party once again. Now LP. Flags of convenience. What will be the new “flag” after May 2016?
Third, there are a multiplicity of “local” parties, better defined as the vehicles of dynastic politics. They “ally” with national parties for convenience, depending on the relative strength or perceived winnability in their locality of the presidential candidate. Meanwhile, they perpetuate their hold on their territory, regardless of who becomes president, with whom they will “ally” once more after the election, or just before when victory is in the air.
In fine, the machinery will deliver only if: first, the presidential candidate it supports has a reasonably good chance of winning; and second, if there is some reasonable financial assistance given the local machinery operators. Sometimes, there are personal ties that bind the presidential candidate to the local officials who operate the machinery, but that is becoming more the exception than the reality on the ground. Loyalty used to be a sacred virtue among politicians in the heyday of the NP-LP dichotomy; now it has become passé, replaced by “practicality.” Wrong, but reality.
The single most important element, to my mind, is the observation seen through several campaigns since Cory versus Marcos, that the Filipino voter distinguishes between his vote sentiment, even loyalty to the local candidates, as against the presidential candidate who “wins” his heart and mind. Which is also why depriving the Filipino voters of their right to choose their political “supremo,” the president, as in a purely parliamentary form, will be resisted.
“Sa iyo ako, Mayor/Gov/Cong, pero kursunada ko talaga si … sa pagka-pangulo”, is how the “market” explains to his local “boss”. And what local candidate will say, “Kung hindi mo dadalhin ang pangulo ko, kalimutan mo na rin ako.” No one. That is how the machinery crumbles.
So in the next 90 days or so, it will be a battle of messages. Which message will win the hearts and minds of the bigger share of the vote market?
How congruent will the message/s be with the persona of the one mouthing the message? Hindi pwedeng “plastik.” Even the unlettered can see through that.
That is what candidates need the surveys for. And qualitative research as well.
The machinery may help, especially if the survey results in the last three weeks before E-Day are quite close for the leading candidates. If the losing candidates’ message fails to capture voter belief by then, there will be a bandwagon towards the winning candidate.
We want real, meaningful change in the way we elect our leaders? Change the constitutional set-up. Nothing short of it will work.