“A physician has a duty to disclose… to his patient… [the] grave risks of injury [to be suffered by him or her] from a proposed course of treatment…”
“THE doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes far back into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not gained consent [from] their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure.” (Que v. Philippine Heart Center, et al., G.R. 268308, April 2, 2025 citing Li v. Spouses Soliman)
The United States Supreme Court, in “the seminal case [of] Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital… upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any medical procedure or treatment.”
However, “a physician has a duty to disclose… to his patient… [the] grave risks of injury [to be suffered by him or her] from a proposed course of treatment…” (Op cit.)
“The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only requires… a reasonable explanation… in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals… to be achieved, and the risks that may ensue from [a] particular treatment or no treatment.” (Op Cit.)
“The court thus concluded that the patient’s right of self-decision can only be effectively exercised if the patient possesses adequate information to enable him [to make] an intelligent choice.
“The scope of the physician’s communications to the patient, then must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is whatever information is material to the decision.” (Op Cit.)
In the case of Que v. Philippine Heart Center, et al., “Dr. Aventura recommended [to the Que family] a new non-invasive treatment for an aneurysm, a ‘state-of-the-art’ procedure that uses a custom-built gadget called a stent and is an alternative to open-method surgery.” (Op Cit.)
“The Que family had reservations about the procedure, but Dr. Aventura assured them the operation would be less risky than the traditional open-method surgery since there was less risk of bleeding or rupture of the aneurysm itself and a smaller chance of paralysis.” (Op Cit.)
“Dr. Aventura informed the Que family, most especially [patient] Quintin, of the material risks inherent in the stenting procedure, and that includes death.
“Dr. Aventura also informed the family that if they decide to continue the operation, another physician will operate on Quintin…”(Op Cit.)
“On the scheduled operation…, Dr. Aventura introduced Dr. Verhoeven to the Que family as the Belgian doctor specializing in stenting procedures.”
“[Dr. Verhoeven] also demonstrated to [them] how the stents would be deployed into Quintin’s body, remarking that it would be his first time to deploy a stent into a curve like the aortic arch.” (Op Cit.)
“Quintin signed the Consent for Endovascular Stenting and the Consent to Operation, Administration of Anesthesia, and the Rendering of Other Medical Services.” However, after the operation, Dr. Verhoeven informed the Que Family “that he could not complete the operation…” (Op Cit.)
Quintin never woke up and later suffered a stroke which led to his death. The Que family felt that Dr. Aventura “turned his back” on them and they “also discovered that Dr. Verhoeven was not qualified or admitted to practice medicine in the Philippines.” (Op Cit.)
The Supreme Court was confronted with the questions on “whether Dr. Aventura’s actions caused harm to Quintin and whether these were the proximate cause of Quintin’s death.” The questions were answered in the negative.
“[W]itnesses Dr. Tuazon and Dr. Figueroa, both experts in the field of cardiovascular and endovascular surgery, testified that stenting would still be the sound medical advice and treatment for Quintin rather than the open-method surgery, considering his underlying condition.” (Op Cit.)
They also “testified that the stroke experienced by Quintin, which led to his death, was one of the inherent risks involved in a stenting procedure. To be sure, Quintin would have had a stroke regardless of whether the device was successfully deployed on him or not.” (Op Cit.)
The Supreme Court explained that “[n]egligence was not the proximate cause of Quintin’s death. Proximate cause is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, without which the result would not have occurred.” (Op Cit.)
Further, the Court declared that “[a]bsent proof that Quintin’s signature was forged or Quintin was incapable of giving intelligent consent when he signed the two documents” the consent forms were valid. (Op Cit.)
Evidently, Dr. Aventura was freed from liability not solely due to the execution of the consent forms but the absence of evidence showing that Quintin’s death was due to the negligence of Dr. Aventura.
