Despite the still-prodigious support for President Rodrigo Duterte, one issue manages to divide even his staunchest, most devoted followers: Foreign policy. In particular, some say that his perceived closeness to Beijing even as he pivots away from the United States belies his claims of instituting a so-called independent foreign policy.
This was brought to fore anew when reports surfaced that Chinese ships were seen surveying the waters of Benham Rise, the huge potentially resource-rich area east of the country. To many, Duterte’s lackadaisical reaction to the reports—including a joke about the Philippines becoming a Chinese province—signaled the same subservience to what had been perceived as characteristic aggression from Beijing. This also represents a clear turnaround from the vigorous stance put up by Duterte’s predecessor, Noynoy Aquino, whose administration challenged China’s belligerence in the West Philippine Sea by filing and winning an arbitration case at The Hague.
But Duterte is only being “strategic,” some might point out, because he knows that antagonizing the rising Asian power will not be productive, as China’s sheer military might will enable it to do anything it pleases, whether it’s in the West Philippine Sea or Benham Rise.
What is Duterte’s real foreign policy then, and what kind of prospects does it hold? For Dr. Renato de Castro, a professor of international studies at De La Salle University, the “major security challenge” posed by Beijing’s moves are surely unprecedented and thus require a complex approach.
“A lot of developments right now seem to be superseding some of the points raised by historians, specifically when we talk about our country’s policy vis-à-vis China in the light of its assertive behavior in the South China Sea,” Dr. De Castro told the audience at a recent forum organized by the think-tank Stratbase ADR Institute for International Studies.
But Duterte’s actions, he added, seem to undermine, if not completely undo, what the Aquino administration has achieved in terms of maintaining relative stability in the region, in alliance with Washington.
“The AFP’s buildup of its territorial defense capabilities is aimed to complement the deterrence provided by the US forward deployed forces,” he said. “It was predicated upon the US’ assertion of its position as the dominant naval power in the Pacific. In a way, the minimum deterrent effort envisioned by the AFP coincided with the Obama administration’s decision to pursue a rebalancing to Asia.”
For his part, Duterte played down the victory of the country’s arbitration case against China. He also declared the end of the joint patrols between the Philippine and US Navies in the West Philippine Sea. He even said that the Philippine-US Amphibious Landing Exercise 2016 would be the last joint military exercise between two allies.
What this reveals, according to Dr. de Castro, is a shift in Philippine policy on China from that of balancing to appeasement. “[But] with that change, you are generating a crisis not only with our alliance with the United States but with our security partnerships with South Korea, Japan, and even Australia.”
Dr. De Castro said the complexity of the region’s security situation has blurred the notion of “independent foreign policy.” “Absolute independence only exists in the mind,” he stressed. Severing ties with a long-time superpower ally only to kowtow to another does not constitute independence.
Instead, the Philippines should leverage on its existing reliable alliances. It should maintain stable and healthy relations with the United States by implementing the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. More crucially, the country should explore how the VFA can facilitate the involvement of South Korea, Japan, and Australia in enhancing AFP’s capabilities in maritime security.
Foreign and defense policies should also be coordinated with the US and its security partners through annual defense consultations, joint trainings in counter-terrorism and maritime security, among others. At the same time, the Philippines should continue to build up its maritime capacity through arms acquisition from and training with the US and its key security partners.
Dealing with China need not be a zero-sum game, he said. The Philippines should lay the groundwork for constructive bilateral negotiations that are guided by the primacy of the rule of law and close consultation with other allies.
Dr. De Castro also emphasized that while policy should be determined by the national leadership, it is a decision that cannot be taken lightly. “There should be a public discussion, in which all stakeholders, first and foremost the people, are consulted.” The strength of public opinion against Duterte’s forgiving attitude toward China attests to this.