This year, the Philippines and Japan significantly deepened their defense cooperation with developments that directly boost our position in the West Philippine Sea.
First, there’s the activation of the Reciprocal Access Agreement between our two countries on Sept. 11. Under this agreement , Philippine and Japanese forces conduct joint training, humanitarian missions, and disaster response operations on each other’s territory.
It streamlines logistics, clarifies the legal status of visiting troops, and facilitates operational planning similar to the Philippines–US Visiting Forces Agreement.
Second, under the RAA, the Philippine Navy started to conduct joint naval drills. Held Sept. 12–13, the 11th Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity involved the Philippines, Japan, and the US.
This was conducted in waters off Magalawa Island to Silanguin Island, Zambales, within the Philippine EEZ and near Scarborough Shoal, a flashpoint in the WPS dispute.
The drills demonstrated enhanced maritime capabilities, including anti-submarine warfare, interdiction, search and rescue, and maritime domain awareness.
These served to improve real-time coordination, shared intelligence, and response capability which are critical in contested waters where rapid reaction is essential.
During the drills, a Chinese warship was challenged via radio by the Philippine Navy, citing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS, the 2016 Arbitral Award, and the Philippine Maritime Zone Act.
Japan’s visible participation in the drills showed regional solidarity and a rules-based stance against coercive behavior by China in the West Philippine Sea
The presence of Japanese forces alongside Philippine and US assets sends a clear signal of multilateral resolve to prevent unilateral Chinese actions in the disputed waters.
More than these, our RAA with Japan reinforces the Philippine position our maritime claims are backed by international law and supported by democratic allies.
Joint exercises with Japan also counters China’s narrative that disputes should be resolved bilaterally, excluding third-party involvement.
Our defense cooperation with Japan complements ASEAN efforts and aligns with broader Indo-Pacific strategies for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
It also represents a recalibration of regional power dynamics.
Our alliance with Japan and the US is evolving into a broader multilateral security architecture that is strategic and potentially transformative for the Indo-Pacific region.
Not surprisingly, China’s response to our bilateral defense cooperation with both Japan and the United States has been to accuse the Philippines of provocations.
But we have to boldly assert our legal rights under UNCLOS or else we would be remiss in our duty to defend our national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
