“This is not about being for or against impeachment. It’s about ensuring that our Constitutional processes are followed properly”
IN THE full-hearted debate over whether the Senate was right to return the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Sara Duterte to the House of Representatives, everyone has an opinion.
More often than not, however, these opinions come from people who have already made up their minds about whether the vice president should be convicted or acquitted.
Thankfully, there are still legal minds who choose to inform rather than inflame the public.
One of them is retired Justice Adolf Azcuna, one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, who has posted several thoughtful commentaries on Facebook.
Azcuna has weighed in on whether the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has done anything to contravene the Constitution. In his posts and in media interviews, the respected jurist says it has not.
Another legal scholar, lawyer Alexis Medina—a Constitutional law professor at San Sebastian College and an alumnus of the UP College of Law—has also contributed meaningfully to the discussion.
In a paper now circulating online, Medina argues the Senate acted well within its powers when it returned the Articles of Impeachment to the House.
Medina’s central thesis is simple: when the Senate sits as an impeachment court, it sheds its purely political character and assumes a judicial role—one that entitles it to the same powers and discretion as any court of law.
This isn’t just a matter of opinion.
The Constitution itself refers to the Senate’s impeachment role using language typical of the judiciary: terms like “trial,” “judgment,” and “conviction.”
He notes that senator-judges wear robes, follow rules of evidence, and hear witnesses. The conclusion is hard to ignore: if it walks like a court, talks like a court, and acts like a court, then it’s a court.
As Medina explains, no judge would proceed to trial without first asking two basic questions: is this case properly before me and is there a legal defect that prevents me from hearing it?
The Senate, before commencing with the trial, must do the same.
That is precisely what it sought to do when it returned the case to the House. It wasn’t shirking responsibility, it was exercising it, cautiously and constitutionally.
In his paper the law professor also tackles the oft-cited Constitutional phrase that the Senate “shall forthwith proceed” with trial. He clarifies that “forthwith” doesn’t mean “recklessly” or “immediately at all costs.”
If there’s a serious question, such as whether the complaint violates the one-year ban on filing multiple impeachment complaints against the same official, then the Senate has not only the right, but the duty, to resolve it first.
Otherwise, any eventual conviction could be declared void, making a mockery of the process.
This is not about being for or against impeachment. It’s about ensuring that our Constitutional processes are followed properly.
Medina’s paper is a welcome reprieve from the partisan noise dominating the media.
At a time when nearly every public statement is colored by political allegiance, we need more unbiased and reasoned voices like his—voices that are neither green, red, nor pink, but simply grounded in the law and in the public interest.
Let the House address the jurisdictional concerns raised by the Senate.
Let the Senate proceed with trial only if and when the case meets constitutional standards.
And let the rest of us, as citizens, do our part.
Not by rushing to judgment, but by taking the time to understand the issues at hand with the help of informed legal perspectives from the Azcunas and Medinas in our midst.
(The author is a BA 2007 graduate of the University of the Philippines-Diliman who spends his days “keenly observing the ways of the world.”)
