Two issues involving our uniformed services have been the subject of much discussion by old foggies like me from the service. Everyone agrees that both are not good ideas.
These concern the organization of a special AFP unit to help in the anti-drug war and the transfer of about 300 PNP personnel with various administrative cases to Basilan to fight terrorists. Both were upon the direct orders of President Duterte.
To be fair, this is not the first time that military personnel would be involved in law enforcement and problematic police personnel being transferred to Mindanao. But this is the first time that both were done with so much media coverage. I am sure that the public remembers the old PC Metrocom. When it was first organized, many of the personnel were from the military. Its first commander was in fact an army general.
Gradually, however, all those coming from the army and other services returned to their mother units leaving only the constabulary personnel to compose the Metrocom. If I read the President correctly, this move by him stems from his frustration with the turn of events in his anti-drug war. He is probably looking for more disciplined units unexposed to the temptation of big money that comes from the drug trade. AFP Chief of Staff General Eduardo Año said that a battalion size unit—between 300 and 800 men—will be organized to assist in the anti-drug war.
The focus will be intelligence, big names in the drug trade and the destruction of illegal drug laboratories. But as experience has taught us, there are problems with involving the military in law enforcement duties.
First among these is training. The military is not trained in law enforcement. Police work involves the collection of intelligence, investigation, case filing and court appearances. This is something the military is not familiar with.
There is also a big difference between so-called police intelligence and military intelligence. Police intelligence must stand scrutiny in court. Another reason is that with all our problems in the South, this unit could better be used in the insurgency campaign and other threat groups in Mindanao. If we want a disciplined unit that is not yet exposed to big-time corruption, perhaps our leaders could consider detaching one battalion from the PNP SAF to assist in the drug war.
Although the SAF is the fighting unit of the PNP in the insurgency campaign, at least they are trained in police work and could adjust more quickly to regular police work than an army or marine battalion.
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The practice of transferring problematic PNP personnel to Mindanao is nothing new. It has happened before. Hard-to-handle personnel, especially those from Luzon, often find themselves sent to the South which is considered a hardship assignment. It used to be that problematic police personnel were simply sent for retraining. Two months of training to improve their physical conditions usually would do wonders.
This, as well as cleaning the Pasig River, was apparently considered for the 300 policemen. In the end, however, the President decided to send them to Basilan to fight the Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist groups. If they survive for two years, then they could come back to Luzon. But problems have already started even before the process could begin. Many of those presented to the President in Malacañang were replaced by people who were not there.
There are also allegations that senior PNP officers intervened to remove their proteges from the list and replaced them with new names. Consequently, only 53 out of the 300 who reported to Villamor Air Base will be transported to Zamboanga City. The obvious step here is to declare those who did not report as Absent Without Official Leave or AWOL then drop them from the PNP roster.
We do not know really if some will still report to Basilan but my guess is that they will try to apply all the available tricks in the book to wiggle their way out of their predicament. But that will be terrible a waste of resources. Even those who reported will immediately apply for leave and spend as much time out of Basilan. Could there have been a better way to handle the problem? The President said that the Basilan assignment is probably the best of the worst choices. Investigating them then firing them will just release 300 potential criminals on our streets which will just make the crime situation worse. But this is assuming that all of them are guilty. Even if all of them are fired, it is doubtful if all of them will become criminals. If they do, 300 really is not such a big number in the overall scheme of things. And since they are all known to the Police, it will be easier to look for them and arrest them.
With what has happened, it is hard to see them becoming productive members of the Basilan PNP provincial office. Maybe as a guide for future administrations, what will happen to those 53 who reported and the more than 200 who did not should be tracked to determine whether this kind of approach to solving such a problem is good or not. The general sentiment of those I talked to in the handling is that both could have been handled differently.
But maybe the President has something in mind that we do not know about. After all, he has had a long experience of handling similar problems not only as a mayor but as a clever politician.
