“The proposed quasi-judicial powers will elevate the CHR’s enforcement capability”
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is on the right track in urging Congress to pass pending bills establishing a formal charter for the constitutional body, as this would undoubtedly strengthen its powers and secure its independence in line with international standards.
In a position paper covering House Bills Nos. 349, 1433, 1798, 3041, 3934, 4835, and 4946, the CHR expressed its “full support” for the legislation. “With its enactment, the Commission will be strengthened in ‘advancing and defending human rights’ of all nationwide including Filipinos living abroad,” it reiterated in the paper.
The proposed charter for the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) would significantly strengthen its institutional capacity to defend human rights in the Philippines by addressing long-standing structural, jurisdictional, and independence-related constraints that have limited its effectiveness since its creation under the 1987 Constitution.
The expansion of investigative powers to cover all human rights violations, including economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR), is a substantive development.
Traditionally, public discourse around human rights enforcement in the Philippines has centered on civil and political rights—extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary detention.
However, international human rights law recognizes ESCR—such as rights to housing, health, education, and work—as equally enforceable.
By explicitly granting jurisdiction over these areas, the charter would align the CHR’s mandate with the indivisibility and interdependence principles embedded in global human rights doctrine.
This expansion would allow the Commission to address structural inequalities and systemic deprivation, which are deeply embedded in Philippine socio-economic realities.
Granting the CHR authority to investigate private actors and non-state entities corrects a critical gap. Contemporary human rights violations increasingly involve private corporations, security agencies, paramilitary groups, and other non-state actors. Under a purely state-centered accountability model, victims often lack accessible remedies. Extending jurisdiction to private entities operationalizes the
State’s obligation to protect against third-party abuses—an established norm under international human rights law.
The proposed quasi-judicial powers will elevate the CHR’s enforcement capability.
At present, the Commission largely performs fact-finding and recommendatory functions.
While valuable, these lack binding force. The ability to determine violations, award compensation, and recommend prosecution transforms the CHR from a predominantly advisory body into an institution capable of delivering tangible remedies. This would improve victim access to justice, reduce procedural fragmentation, and increase the deterrent effect against violators.
The strengthening of visitorial and protective powers, including unannounced inspections of detention facilities and enforceable protection orders, is particularly significant in a context where custodial abuses remain a recurring concern.
Mandatory access backed by penalties for non-compliance enhances transparency and reduces impunity within law enforcement and correctional institutions. Preventive monitoring is internationally recognized as one of the most effective safeguards against torture and ill-treatment.
Institutional independence is another critical dimension. A protected budget and a transparent appointment process shield the Commission from political retaliation or executive interference.
Human rights institutions are often politically inconvenient because they scrutinize state conduct. Without fiscal autonomy and secure leadership tenure, oversight bodies risk budgetary manipulation or leadership capture. Embedding these safeguards in a charter enhances structural independence and operational continuity.
Moreover, compliance with the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions standards—commonly known as the Paris Principles—is strategically important.
Retaining “A status” accreditation ensures that the CHR maintains full participatory rights in international human rights mechanisms, including the UN Human Rights Council.
This strengthens the Philippines’ credibility in global forums and reinforces accountability through peer scrutiny.
In the end, the enactment of a formal charter consolidates the CHR’s constitutional mandate into a coherent statutory framework with enforceable authority. It transforms the Commission from a primarily recommendatory body into a rights-protective institution with investigative breadth, remedial capacity, structural independence, and international legitimacy. In a country where human rights enforcement has often depended on political will, institutionalizing these powers would significantly fortify the architecture of rights protection and enhance the State’s ability to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights obligations.
(Email: ernhil@yahoo.com)
