“These destroyers, equipped with anti-ship missiles, torpedo tubes, and advanced sensors, will significantly boost our ability to deter encroachments”
RECENT news reports indicate Japan has offered to donate six Abukuma-class destroyers to the Philippines amid ongoing tensions in the South China Sea.
These vessels are destroyer escorts operated by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Though officially designated as “escort vessels” due to Japan’s postwar defense-oriented terminology, these ships are compact yet well-armed for their size and role.
Primarily built for coastal defense and anti-submarine warfare, these vessels entered service in the 1990s, making them older but still relevant for our needs.
The Philippine Navy is said to already inspecting the vessels, and if approved, this would mark Japan’s first export of destroyers to another country.
For the Philippines, the acquisition of the Japanese naval vessels represents a capability leap.
The Philippine Navy has relied mostly on frigates and corvettes. These destroyers offer a leap in firepower and survivability, especially in anti-submarine and surface warfare.
But there are operational challenges for our navy. These ships are over 30 years old and require significant crew and maintenance. Integration into the fleet will demand training, logistics upgrades, and possibly retrofitting.
Tokyo’s offer to transfer the warships to the Philippines should be seen as more than just a naval upgrade; it is a strategic signal in the shifting power dynamics of the Indo-Pacific.
It will strengthen regional deterrence.
The Philippines has long faced challenges asserting its maritime claims in the South China Sea.
These destroyers, equipped with anti-ship missiles, torpedo tubes, and advanced sensors, will significantly boost our ability to deter encroachments.
This also demonstrates Japan’s increasingly assertive posture.
We must remember that while postwar Japan has maintained a pacifist constitution, this transfer, framed as a joint development project to sidestep export restrictions, reflects Tokyo’s growing willingness to counterbalance China’s maritime assertiveness, especially given its own tensions in the East China Sea.
The Japanese offer also fits into a broader pattern of cooperation among Japan, the Philippines, and the United States.
Their trilateral summit in 2024 emphasized joint defense and interoperability.
It also sends a clear message to China that regional players are banding together to resist unilateral actions in contested waters.
This transfer may also encourage other Southeast Asian nations to deepen defense ties with Japan or the U.S., especially those with similar maritime disputes.
This isn’t just about ships; it is also about shaping the rules of engagement in one of the world’s most contested maritime regions.
But how would China view this latest development?
Our next-door neighbor is likely to respond to Japan’s donation of destroyers to the Philippines with a mix of diplomatic protest, strategic signaling, and increased maritime activity.
We can expect strong statements from China’s Foreign Ministry accusing Japan of “interference” or “provocation.”
Beijing often frames such moves as destabilizing the region and undermining its claims in the South China Sea.
China could also intensify efforts to sway other Southeast Asian nations away from deeper security ties with Japan or the US, emphasizing economic incentives and regional stability.
We also see increased maritime escalation.
China could ramp up Coast Guard and PLA Navy patrols near disputed areas like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands, a tactic it has used before to assert dominance.
Beijing could also resort to what’s described as grey zone tactics, with more aggressive maneuvers, such as blocking or shadowing Philippine vessels, possibly in the works.
A recent incident involving a China Coast Guard ship colliding with a PLA Navy vessel while chasing a Philippine patrol ship near Scarborough Shoal shows how chaotic and risky these encounters can become.
China could also conduct large-scale naval exercises in the South China Sea to showcase its capabilities and send a warning to both Manila and Tokyo.
Moreover, Beijing could ramp up propaganda and disinformation campaigns amplifying narratives portraying the Philippines as a pawn of foreign powers and Japan as reviving militarism.
Apart from these, Beijing could also use trade or investment as a carrot or a stick to influence Philippine policy, especially in sectors like infrastructure or agriculture. (Email: ernhil@yahoo.com)
