We’re not quite sure if we understood what incoming National Security Adviser Clarita Carlos really meant when she said recently that she is “done with peace talks” with communist rebels.
That’s because, in the same breath, she said they should be invited “to be part of change.”
Maybe she was referring to formal peace talks that have been held abroad, brokered by the Norwegian government in its last round, that went pffft because the talking was going on at the negotiating table while the two sides were lunging at each other’s throats out in the battlefield seemingly with unmitigated glee.
But the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) was established precisely as a response to the futility of formal peace talks without a bilateral ceasefire in place.
The rationale was to seek out armed rebels in the far-flung areas and convince them to surrender their firearms and return to the mainstream of society in exchange for livelihood and housing assistance for their families.
The Task Force boasts of having convinced thousands of NPA rebels and sympathizers to return to the fold of the law.
But didn’t the military also boast of having whittled down the number of NPA rebels to just a few thousands through relentless offensive operations against them?
The problem with ignoring the national leadership of the CPP-NPA-NDF and dealing only with local cadres and commanders is that the latter move only under central guidance, or instructions from above.
If the local cadres and commanders move on their own, they take a big risk of finding themselves facing the business end of an AK-47 assault rifle from higher organs and their own comrades-in-arms.
The retired UP professor said that the two sides have already reached agreement on “certain things.”
As far as we know, the only agreement reached as far back as the 1990s was the JASIG, or Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees for rebels taking part in the peace process.
But it appears that only the aliases of rebels and not their real names have been reflected in documents pertaining to JASIG.
Again, if we’re not mistaken, the two sides in the 2016 peace talks discussed drafts of an agreement on social and economic reforms.
But no agreement was reached at all on substantive issues, because the NDF draft contained outlandish demands, short of calling for a coalition government.
Carlos is therefore mistaken in saying that the two sides have already reached agreement on “certain things.” If they did, it’s not about social and economic reforms, electoral and political reforms, and cessation of hostilities and disposition of forces that comprise the substantive phase of a comprehensive peace agreement.
In other words, it’s back to square one as far as formal peace talks are concerned, and we’ve not moved an inch in reaching agreement on addressing the fundamental causes of the armed conflict.
Carlos is entirely correct, however, in saying that Red-tagging is counter-productive and does not lead to an atmosphere conducive to a durable peace in this country.
The new administration should work towards what might be called an “inclusive peace” that involves government, the private sector and civil society in finding lasting solutions to poverty and social injustice that breed rebellion.
