Congress, assembled in joint session as ordained by the Constitution, has overwhelmingly voted to grant the President’s request to extend martial law in Mindanao until Dec. 31, and despite the sycophantic suggestion of one of their more obsequious kin, the legislators, thankfully, paid little heed to the proposal to extend it not only in time but in breadth—over the entire archipelago.
I disagree with Senator Risa Hontiveros on a number of things, but I laud her for having asked the right questions, in the same measure that I begrudge the “resource persons” from the Executive Branch for having given her all the wrong answers. She asked, quite relevantly, why there was a need to extend martial law until December if the government claims that it is in full control of the situation, that the skirmishes are confined to Marawi City and that most of the Maute have been “neutralized.” She was regaled by the resource persons with accounts of drugs seized from couriers, coddlers and supporters of the pesky group. And of course that is the wrong answer because you do not use martial law to crack down on crack and other pernicious substances! Or perhaps, it was the truthful answer, and the wrong reason for asking for an extension of martial law.
Then there was the equally important question that did go to the heart of the matter: What does the government hope to achieve by martial law that it cannot bring to the pass by any of the laws now in force, such as the Human Security Act (the Anti-Terrorism Law)? That was raising the fundamental question of constitutional law and political theory: Exactly what, under the 1987 Constitution, is the legal effect of martial law? And all she got in reply was rambling that just muddled the issue even more. That really made me wonder: Why did the resource persons not prepare to argue more convincingly? Were they very confident of a felicitous outcome because of the vaunted “supermajority” that the administration has at its beck and call in the Lower House?
That brings me to my point on a representative democracy. “Majority” is not a bad word. In fact, whether in presidential or parliamentary democracies, it is having a majority that makes a government feasible. A president upon whom is forced a hostile congress is in for a very rough ride, and a prime minister chosen from a party that does not command a controlling majority in parliament sits atop a tottering pole! But when “majority” becomes synonymous to sycophancy, then rationality is threatened, because the “ayes” will always have it, as long as the leader of the pack introduces the proposition, no matter how preposterous it may be. When party loyalty means kinship in ideals and consensus about a program of government, that forebodes well for a democracy, for there is room even for debate within the party. But it has hardly ever been like that in this country. For now, LP means PNoy, and, of course, that means “dilawan” and everything despised about it, just as the President’s party means him—and standing by him, no matter that his rants may be outrageous at times. The prevalence of the majority was never meant to substitute for communicative action, and just because one has the numbers, it does not follow that one has the correct reasons. At best, “majority rules” is an expedient device that postpones debate and exchange and allows resolute action to take place in circumstances when a decision has to be expeditiously and definitively made, on the proviso that debate will resume and decisions stand to be corrected under more propitious circumstances.
No, I think Senator Frank Drilon was not correct in advancing the proposition that martial law, when extended, cannot have a period longer than the 60-day period allotted for it when it is initially declared. That cannot be a plausible reading because there is no way of predicting that the emergency that requires martial law will be resolved within 60 days. Rebels and invaders recognize no deadlines. Lingering wars of attrition are not unknown. So it is that the Constitution allows Congress, upon initiative of the President, to extend martial law—without setting deadlines.
But the constitutional conditions must be met: the existence of rebellion (or invasion) AND the demand of public safety. And the Constitution is as meaningful in its silence as in what it provides. The “imminent danger thereof” of the 1935 Constitution has been stricken off. That can only mean that the rebellion or the invasion must be actual and not merely feared, much less conjectured! That these requisites are presently fulfilled so as to justify the extension of martial law—this, I could not appreciate in the rambling comments, answers and perorations of the “resource persons.” And that is why the resolve of some groups to bring the matter to the Supreme Court once more should be welcome. And the Court will not be bound to decide in the same way that it decided the Medialdea consolidated cases. Then, the issue was whether or not there were indeed factual bases for the exercise of the twin emergency powers—declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This time around, the question will be different: Does a state of rebellion continue to exist and does public safety require that martial law remain in place, until Santa Clause comes along to take it back with him to the North Pole?
rannie_aquino@csu.edu.ph
rannie_aquino@sanbeda.edu.ph
rannie_aquino@outlook.com