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Philippines
Friday, March 29, 2024

The Ombudsman and elected officials

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When the 1987 Constitution created the Office of the Ombudsman—not for the first time, though, because the 1973 Constitution provided for a similar office—it was prodigal in its grant of power. Article XI of the Constitution grants it authority over all public officials. The only reason that impeachable officials, members of the Judiciary and members of Congress are placed beyond the reach of the “sumbungan ng bayan” is an attempt to reconcile the amplitude of the Ombudsman’s reach with the other provisions of the Constitution. I am not too sure that the particular provision of the statute is valid—limiting, as it does the application of an express Constitutional provision. In respect to members of the judiciary, all that the Constitution provides is that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over members of the Bench. About legislators, Article VI merely grants each chamber the authority to discipline its members. In neither case is the grant of power exclusive. Impeachable officials are quite a different thing altogether—for you cannot do indirectly (through the exercise of the Ombudsman’s power) what the Constitution directs should be done only through impeachment —removal from office.

The disputed question at the present time is whether or not the Ombudsman may, by a decision, oust a senator from his seat? While some think that the Ombudsman has no power over members of Congress insofar as administrative cases are concerned, matters are really not that simple. If a senator occupied public office before his election as senator, and was administratively charged because of such a position, that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the charge is not doubted. What happens though if the case is unresolved at the time the respondent official is elected to the Legislature?

This is where the complication arises. One could advance the position—with plausibility—that as the official is held to account for malfeasance or misfeasance because of the office he once occupied, he cannot and should not—by the expedient of being elected—be able to elude accountability. In fact, this is the very reason that the Supreme Court rejected the “doctrine of condonation”, decreeing that it would apply one last time to Junjun Binay and to no one else thereafter. Sed contra, there is the long-entrenched belief that as legislators are elected representatives of the people, one cannot, without prejudice to the right of the sovereign people to choose their representatives, oust them from office. But the fact is that they can be ousted by criminal process, as when they are convicted by final judgment, or by a definitive finding of an election irregularity.

One way I think that equities are balanced is for the chamber to treat the Ombudsman judgment as a complaint against the respondent legislator. If the legislator does not appeal the judgment of the Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals, then he admits the charge—and should accordingly be disciplined, and, in accordance with the judgment of the Ombudsman, expelled by the chamber of which he is a member. Should he appeal to the Court of Appeals, and the Ombudsman is reversed, the matter is brought to a closure. But if the Court of Appeals upholds the verdict and the judgment attains finality, then, the chamber has no choice—unless it wants to defy the Ombudsman and the Courts which it would be most reckless to do—but to discipline its member by expulsion. Resultantly, both the powers of the Ombudsman and of the chambers of Congress are upheld.

It does not serve the public interest for Congress to transform this matter into a tug-of-war with the Ombudsman. And this is precisely why it is of utmost importance that the Ombudsman not only remain fair and just but also appear to the public eye as fair and just!

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rannie_aquino@csu.edu.ph

rannie_aquino@sanbeda.edu.ph

rannie_aquino@outlook.com

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