Erap keeps his seat, this, in the wake of widespread speculation that the justices of the Supreme Court were poised to declare that he was disqualified to run for the office. That, too, was my opinion. And it was not because I did not like Joseph Estrada. At the time he was elected president, I thought he was a disaster of a choice, but, once elected, he was courageous and strong-willed when he should have been, and for that, I admired him. I joined the call for his ouster, and I remain convinced that it was the best thing for the nation that he resigned the office. But I now see that in the light of many things that have taken place since, one of his major “faults” was his insouciance at concealing his misdeeds and blaming others for them! But let us return to the point of law.
Teddy Te, spokesperson of the Court, summed up the Court’s position: the majority of the Court held that the pardon granted Mr. Estrada by the much-maligned former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was an absolute pardon. From that characterization it followed that all of Mr. Estrada’s political and civil rights, otherwise impaired by criminal conviction, were restored him, including the right to vote and the right to be voted for!
True, a conditional pardon must articulate the conditions attached to the grant of clemency. GMA’s pardon did not state any. But does it follow from this that the pardon was absolute? The Court has ruled —and I strongly doubt that any Motion for Reconsideration will yield a different result—and for purposes of the Philippine legal system, its holding in the light of the particularities of the case must now guide the entire Republic! But academic discussion is not thereby foreclosed, as constitutional theorists continue debating, to this very day, such classics as Marbury v. Madison and Baker v. Carr.
In The Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales (2013) the Court depended on the “Whereas clauses” to settle the question of the ambit of the law. One thing then is sure from this and other cases: “Whereas clauses” are not impertinent! Even the interestingly nuanced manner in which Mr. Justice Tinga puts a ‘whereas clause’ to use inKuwait Airways v. Philippine Airlines (2009) is highly instructive. On the one hand, he maintains: “But can a perambulatory clause, which is what the adverted “Whereas” clause is, impose a binding obligation or limitation on the contracting parties? In the case of statutes, while a preamble manifests the reasons for the passage of the statute and aids in the interpretation of any ambiguities within the statute to which it is prefixed, it nonetheless is not an essential part of an act, and it neither enlarges nor confers powers.”
But he continues nevertheless examining the effect of the “whereas clause”. One of the “whereas clauses” in the grant of pardon to Mr. Estrada declared that he was no longer interested in public office. If, as we have been taught, such a perambulatory clause declares the reason for the operative provision —the grant of pardon—and aids in the interpretation of ambiguity, should not the grant of pardon be read as “premised on” Mr. Estrada’s disavowal of aspiration for public office?
It is indeed true that, classically, propositions are either categorical or hypothetical. The sentence granting pardon was categorical. But propositions are read in their
contexts, are they not, and the context of the remission of the penalty and its effects was the grantee’s avowed disinterest in candidacy for public office. I am not saying that the majority of the Court erred. That would be unpardonable presumption. I am only advancing the position that a different reading was plausible!
It is precisely this academic open-endedness that is exciting because it is the stuff of that interesting discipline of legal hermeneutics, which, if handled properly, should be more than statutory construction. It is rather a hermeneutic of the very workings of the legal system, including the fact that notwithstanding the liveliness of the discussion and the academic possibility that it continue, some definitive answer that brings a dispute to an end must be given. And so it is that while indeed the Supreme Court resolves issues of law, it does so as a partaker in the coercive power of State. Alfredo Lim cannot install himself in the City Mayor’s office and will not be allowed to do so, not necessarily because Lim’s legal theory is wrong but because the Supreme Court has ruled against it! Academics, meanwhile, will continue discussing whether he was entitled to the chair or not — and the continued debate too is a good thing for the country!
rannie_aquino@sanbeda.edu.ph
rannie_aquino@csu.edu.ph
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