(Part 2, continued from Monday)
In the ocular inspection of the site of the massacre of the SAF 44, the PNP Board of Inquiry interviewed Mayor Ampatuan of Mamasapano, the Barangay Chairman and Officials of Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano, the BOI learned that normally, armed elements would readily withdraw from an encounter site whenever white phosphorous rounds were delivered by the Field Artillery Battery of the 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.
Unfortunately, however, three (3) white phosphorous artillery rounds were fired late in the afternoon of January 25, when all of the 55thSAC already lay dead, except for one who was able to escape. Why the delay? At 7:30 a.m when the firefight was in progress, the SAF coordinated and requested for indirect artillery fire support from the 1st Mechanized Brigade. The Brigade Commander, Col. Gener Del Rosario, sought clearance for artillery fire from the 6th Infantry Division Commander, Major General Edmundo Pangilinan. While Pangilinan sent infantry and mechanized units to reinforce the SAF, he put on hold the request for indirect artillery fire since, according to him, they still lacked details as mandated by their protocol. Pangilinan also withheld artillery fire support in consideration of the peace process and artillery fire protocols. Still, the report said, that decision could have been made by a Brigade Commander like Col. del Rosario, himself.
Oplan Exodus was defective from the very beginning, the report stressed. Troop movement was mismanaged; troops failed to occupy their positions; there was lack of effective communication among the operating troops; command and control was ineffective and foremost; there was no coordination with the AFP forces and peace mechanism entities.
The report emphasized too that the Chain of Command in the PNP was violated. The President, the suspended Chief PNP Purisima and Napeñas kept the information to themselves. The Chain of Command should be observed in running mission operations, the report said.
The Time on Target strategy adopted in the operation is applicable only to ordinary police operations. In fact, this concept does not even conform to the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP. Even AFP commanders asserted that the Time on Target concept is alien to the Armed Forces and runs counter to their established SOPs. Without coordination, following the AFP definition, support to operating units such as artillery or close air support is not possible since these entail preparation.
Oplan Exodus was not approved by the OIC-PNP who was kept out of the loop. Napeñas dominated the mission planning, disregarding inputs from his subordinate commanders on how the operation will be conducted. The concept of the way-in/way-out, by foot, and night-only infiltration and exfiltration in an enemy controlled community with unrealistic assumptions was a high-risk type of operation.
As Oplan Exodus was being carried out, mobile communication devices were used as a primary mode of communication. However, these devices fell short of what was needed to relay real-time information and coordination of activities to and from the chain of command. Radio Operators were assigned one each for 84th Seaborne and 55thSAC. However, the 55th SAC and 84th Seaborne lost contact during the crucial moments of executing Oplan Exodus. They had to rely on their ears to determine distinctive gunfire and the approximate location of each other. The common Motorola handheld radios failed when submerged in water because these were not designed for military-type of operations. The battery life was short because of wear and tear. Several rounds of ammunition of M203 grenade launchers were defective.
The highlights of the report’s conclusion said that the President gave the go-signal and allowed the execution of Oplan Exodus. He allowed the participation of suspended PNP Chief Alan Purisima in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. The report enumerated in explicit terms the numerous violations of suspended PNP Chief, Purisima.
The President, the report said, exercised his prerogative to deal directly with Napeñas instead of the OIC-PNP Deputy Director General Leonardo Espina. Yet, it said, while the President has the prerogative to deal directly with any of his subordinates, the act of dealing with Napeñas by-passed the established PNP Chain of Command.
The Mamasapano Report stressed the importance of command responsibility, quoting: “A commander is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do.”
I, as a lay person, have these questions to ask. If you were Napeñas and the President himself was dealing directly with you, together with your Chief (Purisima), though suspended, had the apparent full trust of the President in directing the operations, would you have had the gall to not follow every direction given you as a good follower? Who really had command responsibility in Oplan Exodus?
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