(Part 2)
The power of Congress, which includes the House of Representatives, to check a government agency which it considers inefficient can be exercised in a number of ways.
One way is for the House to call for legislation abolishing the said office. Since the Commission on Human Rights is an office created by the Constitution, that option is not available to the House even if it wants to exercise its power to check the CHR.
Another option is for the House to call for a reduction in the annual budget of the office concerned, unless the said office is entitled to fiscal autonomy under the Constitution. Considering that, as pointed out in the first part of this essay, the Supreme Court has already ruled that the Constitution does not mandate any fiscal autonomy for the CHR, this second option is available to the House if it wishes to exercise its power to check the CHR. In fact, the House has done precisely that, when it alloted a P1000 annual budget to the CHR for 2017.
A third option is for the House to call for legislation that will reduce the terms of office of the CHR chairman and members. Such a law is constitutionally permissible because Section 17, Article XIII of the Constitution states that the terms of office of the CHR chairman and its members shall be fixed by law. Whether that can be applied to the incumbents in the CHR is up to Congress to decide.
To deny the power of the House of Representatives to reduce the budget of the CHR is to deprive a house of Congress of its inherent power to check against abuses in government. More specifically, it will mean that Congress is devoid of any power to check against any perceived abuses in the CHR. If that happens, then the principle of checks and balances—a hallmark in a vibrant democracy—becomes illusory.
Opponents of the P1000 annual budget the House alloted to the CHR for 2017 must realize that denouncing the House for approving that measure will get them nowhere.
Taking the issue to the Supreme Court will not be a sound legal option, considering that budget allotment for government agencies is an exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. The Court will be hard put to intervene, mainly because if the Court disagrees with the P1000 budget the House alloted to the CHR, the Court will have to justify what amount the Court believes should be proper in the premises. Strictly speaking, that will be tantamount to a judicial usurpation of legislative power and prerogatives.
Moreoever, the Supreme Court will have to justify why an unelected branch of the government like the Court should let its own opinion prevail over the collective act of an elected branch of the government, especially over a matter that is within the exclusive realm of the legislature.
In addition, the House measure is not yet a law, and it will be premature to question it in a judicial proceeding.
Truth to tell, the time to criticize the House is over. The real debate should be with the congressional bicameral conference—the legislative committee composed of members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives and vested with the responsibility of harmonizing bills, especially conflicting bills, passed by both houses of Congress. The bicameral conference is supposed to produce a unified piece of proposed legislation, which it sends to the President of the Philippines for the latter’s signature.
Since the Senate has taken an opposing stance to the budget alloted by the House to the CHR, and has in fact approved a generous budget for the said agency, the senators in the bicameral conference will have to convince, and ultimately outvote, the representatives in the bicameral conference to yield to the Senate’s version of the 2017 budgetary allotment to the CHR. That, of course, is easier said than done because of the equitable ratio of senators and representatives in the bicameral conference.
At the end of the day, however, whatever measure is approved by the bicameral conference will carry the legislative will. It also means that Congress as a whole, and not just one of its houses, has spoken.
If the President exercises his power under Section 27(2), Article VI of the Constitution and vetoes whatever budget Congress ends up approving for the CHR for 2017, Congress can still override the president’s veto by getting two-thirds of the members of both houses, voting separately, to approve the bill.
Should Congress, however, fail to override the president’s veto, there will be no budget for the CHR for 2017. That would mean that the CHR does not have the support of both the legislature and the executive department. In such an extreme scenario, perhaps only the resignation of the incumbent CHR chairman and its members will save the CHR, although a special appropriations law will still have to be enacted to provide funding for the agency.
Hopefully, however, this divisive legal controversy will be resolved at the level of the congressional bicameral conference committee. Resolving this difficult legal issue at that level is not only practical; it is the only means by which the power of the House of Representatives to check government agencies is upheld and, at the same time, the legislative process mandated by the Constitution is allowed to take its natural course. This procedure is less divisive and, more importantly, it will show how the constitutional process heals constitutional divides.