55 days after

"The economy is on its way to a prolonged, agonizing run before things get back to a new normal which all of us will have to get used to."

Here's the question: 55 days after the imposition of enhanced community quarantine (ECQ) in the entire Luzon and, subsequently, almost all of the other regions, what have we got?

If we go by figures from the Department of Health, we have 11,086 confirmed COVID-19 cases, 726 deaths and 1,999 recoveries.

Out of the close to 60 million people in the Luzon area, only 150,000 have been tested, mostly done by LGUs and the Red Cross. The DoH has yet to ramp up its testing activities to its original target of 8,000 tests per day. The IATF chaired by the Health Secretary has again targeted testing rate at 20,000 by the end of the ECQ on May 16 and 30,000 by end of May to give one and all the kind of confidence level to ease the lockdown more progressively.

Good luck.

On the socio-economic side, the economy is expected to contract by 0.4 percent by end of May; it has already contracted by 0.2 percent as of end of March, considered the deepest contraction since the financial crisis.

Over the same period, jobs lost stood at 1.3 million, not counting the millions in the informal (underground/unregistered) sector and the increased number of underemployed as a result of the lockdown. Government had to realign funds from some sectors in the 2020 budget and borrowed billions of dollars from various financial institutions to come out with a P279 billion package for the Bayanihan-Heal-As-One assistance package for the 18 million families considered as most vulnerable with the lockdown. Various sectors of the economy are reporting billions, maybe even running to trillions of pesos, lost from the 55-day lockdown.

The airlines, tourism and hospitality sectors are claiming hundreds of billions and are asking government to provide loan guarantees, if not outright subsidies. A stimulus package of up to P70 billion pesos for MSMEs has also been proposed for passage before Congress adjourns on June 3.

Overall, the economy is on its way to a prolonged, agonizing run before things get back to a new normal which all of us will have to get used to. We have to tread slowly to prevent a second or third wave of infections which will trigger lockdowns and definitely bring us down lower to the ground.

So the question being raised is: Was this national sacrifice all worth it? Is there any data showing that we would have done better because of ECQ or would have plateaud anyway (as the DoH now claims) taking the Swedish route: no lockdown but with adjusted health protocols and an urgent call for individual responsibility?

As some are now arguing, every year, the flu claims 7,600 lives in the country. We had a so-called dengue outbreak of 41,400 cases and 1,546 dengue-related deaths. And yet we did not lock down. We survived, got on with Christmas, and in fact posted a reasonably above-average growth rate. Well, we do not really know and will probably have better metrics to go around once a COVID-19 vaccine is made available and the cure(s) ready to be administered.

To be fair, we really got ourselves somewhat overwhelmed with COVID-19. This invisible enemy got us in our guts just as we were just adjusting and readying ourselves for a run after the Taal Volcano eruption. Before that, the DoH stumbled over with its handling of the Dengavaxia fiasco, the PhilHealth controversy and the mismanagement of funds allocated for its major programs. Not to mention the reported misuse of billions of pesos in medical purchases, warehousing and related controversies. So, it was unprepared to take on the pandemic.

Worse, in a vain attempt to exhibit a certain level of competence, it pretended it could do the Herculean job of battling this invisible, unimaginably vicious enemy and hamstrung government response in the process. But that is another story altogether.

Given our experience these past 55 days, many are now saying – why did we allow the IATF Chair to wiggle his way leading the task force instead of looking at just how our neighbors in ASEAN like Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam responded with a full blown, reasonable punch?

Take Vietnam, for example, which has a population of 95 million and an economy almost the same as ours. Some are even suggesting we have built in advantages. But no matter. As of April 17, it had only 268 confirmed cases and no deaths. It did not have to beg and borrow billions of pesos to support its vulnerable population and sectors. It did not have to declare a national lockdown lasting for 55 days. It did not have to expose its citizens to such tension and anxiety as has been in our case. And, it did all these, as it was neck deep in preparation for a host of activities as the ASERAN Chair for 2020. How did this super disparity happen at all?

Here's a note from the Diplomatic Post which reviewed Vietnam's timeline and response to Covid 19. May this narrative serve as a lesson to let us do our calibrated easing after 55 days in lockdown in a more sober, proper and responsible manner.

"Vietnam prepared for the outbreak before it recorded its first case. The Ministry of Health issued urgent dispatches on outbreak prevention to relevant government agencies on January 16 and to hospitals and clinics nationwide on January 21. Vietnam recorded its first cases on January 23 in Ho Chi Minh City, just two days before the Lunar New Year holidays. Two Chinese nationals from Wuhan arrived in Vietnam on January 13 and traveled throughout the country before being hospitalized on January 23. Shortly after, the Vietnamese government ramped up its response by organizing the National Steering Committee on Epidemic Prevention on January 30, the same day the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. On February 1, when the country only recorded six confirmed cases, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc signed a decision declaring a national epidemic of what was then known only as the novel coronavirus (nCoV). On February 9, the Ministry of Health held a teleconference with the WHO and 700 hospitals at all levels nationwide to disseminate information on nCoV prevention and launched a website to disseminate information to the wider public. On February 11, the WHO officially named the novel coronavirus disease COVID-19. Aggressive preventive action enabled Vietnam to contain the outbreak, with only 16 cases, all recovered, by the end of February. For further context, the 16th patient was confirmed on February 13 and fully recovered on February 25, meaning that Vietnam went 22 days without any new cases. As a testament to this early success, the U.S. Center for Diseases Control (CDC) decided to take Vietnam off the list of countries with the risk of community spread of the virus. "

" That early success, however, was impeded by the discovery of patient 17. The patient traveled from Hanoi on February 15 to visit England, Italy, and France before returning to Hanoi on March 2 and failed to follow quarantine protocols. Patient 17 was hospitalized on March 6, and two days later, on March 8, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health Vu Duc Dam declared that Vietnam had officially entered the second phase of the fight against COVID-19. Similar to the first phase, marked by the epidemic declaration, the Vietnamese government escalated its public health response to flatten the curve. On March 10, the Ministry of Health launched the health declaration mobile application NCOVI to help the public report their medical conditions and follow the contact tracing operation, just before the WHO declared a global pandemic on March 11. This second phase marked the transition from phase one, in which patients mostly originated from China, to a period when many countries were potential sources of the virus. "

" The transition into the third phase was even faster. Following the detection of two new clusters with unclear origins in Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi (patients zero there were patients 86 and 87) and Buddha Bar in HCM City (patient zero was patient 91 overall), the Vietnamese government suspended foreign entry on March 22, and all exceptions, including national returnees, are subjected to medical checks and mandatory 14-day quarantine. On March 23 the prime minister declared the third phase of the pandemic fight as the risk of community spread is high. When Bach Mai Hospital, one of the country’s top referral hospitals, became the largest and most complex hotbed of COVID-19 in Vietnam following a record of 10 cases linked to the hospital on March 28, on March 30, Prime Minister Phuc announced a nationwide pandemic during a meeting with the National Steering Committee for COVID-19 Prevention and Control. The following day on March 31, the prime minister issued a new directive that would place the nation under limited lockdown effective April 1. The directive enforced national isolation, banned gatherings, and encouraged staying home, closing borders, and implementing quarantine policy, among others."

"Vietnam’s model for containing the outbreak has been touted as a successful low-cost model. Whereas its neighbors, Taiwan and South Korea, could afford mass testing, Vietnam lacked the resources and instead opted for selective but proactive prevention. Aside from some common policy actions such as contact tracing, ramping up production of medical supplies, and installing checkpoints at airports, Vietnam found its success in proactiveness. Over the course of three months since the first case, Vietnam has not hesitated to restrict movements where needed, balancing overt caution with precision."

“For example, the provincial authority was allowed to lock down villages and communes following advisory notices from the Ministry of Health. Since the first cases emerged, there were only five instances of large-scale lockdowns. The first was on February 13 when Vinh Phuc Province confirmed the 16th patient in Son Loi Commune, Binh Xuyen District. On the same day, local authorities locked down the commune of 10,000 people, which confirmed eight patients and established two field hospitals in Vinh Yen Town. The quarantine was lifted on March 4, after 20 days of no new cases. Second, following patient 17’s confirmation on March 6, on March 7 Hanoi locked down Bach Truc Street, where the patient resided along with 66 households and 189 people. The quarantine was lifted on March 20 after no new cases were reported after testing. The last three instances were all after the national limited lockdown directive. On April 2, Hung Yen locked down Chi Trung commune following the confirmation of patient 219. On April 7, Me Linh district of Hanoi locked down Ha Loi village following the confirmation of patient 243. On April 8, Ha Nam province also quarantined Ngo Khe 3 village and medical personnel related to patient 251. These instances of lockdowns contained the risks of community transmission by strictly enforcing checkpoints in and out of the localities and setting up local medical facilities for testing and treatment."

"Another example of aggressive prevention is the closure of schools. Vietnam recorded its first cases just two days before the Lunar New Year holidays, which fortunately had schools closed through February 1. Nonetheless, schools and government authorities extended the holiday season until February 10 on a case-by-case basis. On February 14, the Ministry of Health proposed schools to remain closed until the end of February, at which point schools had already closed nationwide . The decision to close schools nationwide, as a formality, came with the national isolation order on March 31, effective April 1. Consequently, Vietnamese students have not gone to school this spring semester, but schools are gradually adopting online teaching.”

"Despite the aggressive nature of these responses, the underlying factor that enables the Vietnamese government’s success is the mobilization of nationalism. The government has framed the virus as a common foreign enemy and called on the unity of the population to defeat it, echoing the enduring history of a nation always threatened by foreign invaders. Since “day one,” the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the state have led the fight with the motto “fighting the epidemic is like fighting against the enemy.” Nonetheless, calls for nationalism are not without setbacks, as public sentiment was at one point villainizing Vietnamese students returning from abroad for carrying potential risks of transmission. Patient 17 was a notorious example that garnered public criticism, reflecting the effectiveness of the government in rallying the public but also the risk of overzealous nationalism."

“In addition, the government has positioned itself as an effective source of leadership during the pandemic by providing information with transparency. The Ministry of Health took the initiative to launch a website and a mobile application not only to ease the medical process but also to disseminate accurate information quickly. The digital apparatus helped stem the spread of rumors and fake news, in addition to legal enforcement against people who spread inaccurate information or engage in profiteering. State media have also constantly covered the hotspots of the pandemic like China, Italy, Spain, and the United States to raise public awareness about the seriousness of COVID-19 and to demonstrate the essential of robust government intervention.

“By being transparent and proactive in communicating with the public, the government was able to gain and maintain public confidence. In a Dalia Research survey of 45 countries asking about public opinion of government responses to the pandemic, 62 percent of Vietnamese participants said that the government is doing the “right amount,” topping the survey’s average with a higher rate than other “model” countries such as Singapore and South Korea. "

We actually did most of what Vietnam did. Despite earlier criticisms, our people also followed whatever the government advised. We did not lack discipline and we adhered to the protocols. Vietnam may not have as many vulnerable sectors as we had but they went though wars and years of hardships themselves. Yes, they have party discipline and the nation was adept at social mobilization. But we are not far behind, either. We have shown resilience aside from discipline, if need be. Some have even suggested we are more creative and maybe more resourceful. But these are neither here nor there. They had a plan, they strictly implemented it with all the strength and resources at their command including use of available technology and will power. They were proactive, transparent and precise in their actions and communicating the same as simply yet forcefully as possible. So, why? Your conclusion is as good as mine.