Last September 13, President Rodrigo Duterte clarified that the Philippines is not about to cut its security ties with the US or with its allies. He said, “the country is merely undergoing a paradigm shift in dealing with them.” The statement is a clarification on our current relations with the US. Most political analysts rather called it “rectification” of our alliance with the US.
Notably, after the expiration of the Philippines-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the US was forced to give up Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. However, the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 2000 allowed the US forces to return to conduct joint military exercises. No specific area was designated for the bases, but it was clear they could use any part of the archipelago to hold their military exercises. In 2014, President Noynoy Aquino completed the stealthy return of the US forces under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
The return of the US bases was characterized by many as the recolonization of the country much that the Noynoy Aquino administration virtually handed to the US a carte blanche to select the number and location of their bases. The five existing military facilities given were: Antonio Bautista Airbase in Palawan near the South China Sea, Basa Airbase in Pampanga, Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, Lumbia Airbase in Cagayan de Oro and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Airbase in Mactan.
Aside from the exemption in the payment of rent which the country used to collect under the old RP-US Bases Agreement, the visiting US forces could use existing military facilities of the Philippine Armed Forces which would save them the expense of constructing new facilities. As one would say, it was like asking the owner of the house to vacate it to give way to a guest who claims to defend the owner of the house against his neighbors. The Aquino administration even allowed the entry and docking of US warships without first disclosing whether they are carrying nuclear weapons, as required by the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the bringing in and stockpiling of nuclear weapons into the country.
Since the US-engineered ouster of President Marcos in 1986, it is only now under the Duterte administration where the President has sought to clarify our alliance with the US. This includes the identification of our perceived enemies under the reconfigured alliance, in determining our obligations under the treaty or to put it bluntly—who between the two is to be protected by the other? The President did not specifically ask these questions but definitely his idea about our alliance with the US comes within the purview of the paradigm shift he envisions.
Much that our relations with the US is no longer based on ideological consideration, no responsible President would blindly accept the US Pivot to Asia policy without considering its ramifications. President Duterte is looking beyond the Cold War framework of identifying our potential enemy, not on the basis of ideological differences, but on whether they pose a threat to our security, or at the least shares the same concern that they equally pose a threat to their own interest.
If not, we could well conclude that our alliance with the US has failed even before it could be tested to counter the anticipated contingency. An alliance that serves only to protect the interest of one is a dysfunctional one because it deviates from the objective of securing and protecting the mutual interests of the member countries. In fact, no alliance, in its true sense, can exist between an imperialist state and its colonies or between a suzerain and that of its vassals.
Historically, the basis upon which the Philippines allowed the US to establish military bases here is to secure the country against possible invasion by Japan, which in fact happened. It was imperative because the Philippines then was a colony of the US, and Japan had all the reasons to invade the country. After the war, the justification has changed to one of containing China. That was accepted by most Filipinos, for at that time there was intense ideological competition between the so-called capitalist free world and the Marxist socialist states.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the reformatting of the Chinese economy however, resurrected the old system of defining what constitute the strategic and national interest of the state. However, the Philippines remained the only country that has not been able to redefine its alliance with the US based on changing realities.
We continue to maintain our alliance based wholly in securing the interest of the US. There is no longer any valid reason to justify the maintenance of our alliance with the US, much more allow the US to retain their military bases. Rather, our claim in the South China Sea was exacerbated by our antiquated definition of what constitutes our interest, which China sees as no different from the US.
Even if the end of the Cold War erased the ideological wedge that separates the capitalist and socialist states, issues affecting national interest have become complex because countries today no longer weigh their interests on a broad and collective basis of ideological affinity, but on a much narrower scope involving national interest. We do not even know whether our alliance with the US, under the current Pivot to Asia policy of President Obama would produce positive results for us.
For one, while the country originally justified the US presence as necessary to secure those remaining islands still in our possession and to allow our fishermen to enjoy wider areas to harvest and exploit the marine resources adjacent and proximate to the Philippines, the US is more concerned on the issue of freedom of navigation to justify its presence in the South China Sea. This we have seen by their persistence to seek the approval of Asean of its position using the country as its mouthpiece.
Looking at the situation, it now appears that the Philippines is the one securing the interest of the US, and not vice versa in this part of the globe. In the event of conflict, the country would again be fighting a proxy war. Even if we assume that an ideal alliance should be based on the common interests of the member states, that would never work because the US will always have greater interests to protect. Whether one would call it hegemony, that is radiating from one enjoying the status of a superpower, reality would bear out that the US has more stakes in the area which are quite different from our own interest.
When President Duterte abandoned the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and sought a bilateral approach to resolve our dispute with China, that already constitutes a paradigm shift in our relations with the US. That would visibly have an impact on the status of the US bases. This paradigm shift would especially determine whether their presence would remain relevant to our participation in the regular holding of joint naval patrol with the US in the South China Sea. The President knows it would be awkward for the Philippines to join the US and Japanese navies in patrolling the South China Sea, while we seek to bilaterally resolve our claim and improve ties with China.
Finally, when President Duterte ordered all US Special Forces to leave Mindanao, he simply wants to avoid the possibility of giving US the reason to intervene in our domestic affairs. For as long as US troops are in the country, we are committed to provide them the security and deny them the excuse to militarily intervene in our domestic affairs.
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