Con-Com 2018 Member
Q: It has happened that judgments of suspension or dismissal issuing from the Office of the Ombudsman or even by the Sandiganbayan are ignored by the leadership of either chamber of Congress that is protective of its members. Will this still be an issue under the Draft Constitution?
A: Cognizant particularly of this problem, while the Draft Constitution retains the power of either chamber to promulgate rules of discipline and to suspend or expel its members, there is now the added proviso “that each House shall comply with final and executory orders of judicial or quasi-judicial authorities imposing disciplinary sanctions on its members.” Note, however, that since this applies only to “final and executory orders”, orders issued pendente lite or during the pendency of an action are not covered, not are orders of preventive suspension that, strictly speaking, are not penalties. HOWEVER: The doctrine of Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan remains binding jurisprudence: While the Constitution grants the chambers of Congress the right to discipline their members, nowhere is this power characterized as EXCLUSIVE. Furthermore, orders of preventive suspension are not penalties and are therefore of a character other than what the text of the 1987 Constitution, as well as the Draft, contemplate.
Q: Will the Electoral Tribunals of the houses of Congress still exist?
A: No, in their place the Federal Electoral Court, which is one of the high judicial courts established by the draft, shall decide “all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.” The term “qualifications” does not foreclose challenge at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. This will be resolved by the Commission on Elections.
Q: Is there any change in the powers of the Commission on Appointments?
A: Under the Article on the Powers of the President, the Commission on Appointments passes upon appointments to heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers or officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Major General or Rear Admiral and other public officers whose appointments the law requires must be confirmed. The ConCom was apprised by representatives of the military establishment that it was with the rank of Major General that military authority that made a difference in the field and in operations came, and so it was thought best to limit confirmation to Majors General and ranks above. The Commission on Appointments has the power to appoint some of the members of the high courts as well. This constitutes a departure from its traditional role, for while, in the past, its task was limited to confirming appointments made, or rejecting them, in the case of members of the federal high courts, it appoints.
Q: What hearings may Congress or its committees conduct?
A: As in the 1987 Constitution, and clarified by the Supreme Court, there are two kinds of hearings: Section 21 covers those hearings called “in aid of legislation”. Under existing jurisprudence, attendance at such hearings is compulsory, because one of the inherent powers of Congress is to secure the compulsory attendance of witnesses and to punish for contempt. Section 22 covers those hearings in aid of oversight, and they may follow upon the initiative of department heads who, with the consent of the President, wish to communicate to Congress or to any of its committees, OR upon the request of either House.
Q: It has complained that somehow, the “contempt powers” of the Chambers have been misused, with the result that people have been punished who did not give answers that the interrogating legislators did not want. Has anything been done about this?
A: Yes, under Section 21 there is the protective provision what when a person is ordered detained either “when the detention is patently unlawful” or “when its prolonged enforcement becomes unreasonable or violates due process.” Whether detention has become unreasonable or is in violation of due process is a matter of judicial determination, and therefore subject to judicial standards. Being punished for contempt, for one, when one refuses to answer because answering would constitute self-incrimination would be one example of a patently unlawful detention.
Q: There is something new in the Section on the declaration of the state of war that seems to give the President more power than the 1987 Constitution gave him. Is this perception correct?
A: No, it is not. The second paragraph of draft Section 23 merely provides for what is to be done when Congress is no longer able to convene because of the chaos following the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, it is a salutary provision because it places within a constitutional framework what a President would otherwise do freely without any constraints in such exigent circumstances. There is also the very important clause that the powers the President wield “to resolve the situation” may be revoked by Congress when it is able once more to convene. It should be noted that even under the US Constitution, by virtue of the commander-in-chief provisions, the US President can mobilize troops and send them off to war even without the US Congress declaring a state of war.
Q: Why was there need to include a provision on the Bicameral Conference Committee?
A: In effect, while Congresses past has always had the need for a “Bicam”, the body has never had constitutional status, although it was functioning virtually as the “third house” of Congress — since its job was to reconcile conflicting versions of the same bill passed by the two chambers. Draft provision grants the Bi-Cameral Conference Committee constitutional status and prescribes that the compromise version it hammers out be subject to vote by each house.