It has been two years since diminutive Philippines won a historic victory against the giant that is China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which declared the latter’s “nine-dash” line at the South China Sea without basis in history. Two years of what could have been massive political leverage and global ascendancy in promoting the rule of law turned instead into two years of missed opportunities.
On the second anniversary of the ruling, independent think tank Stratbase Albert del Rosario Institute hosted a gathering of international geopolitical experts—thought leaders—to look back on the country’s experience, including the events that led to where we stand today, and scrutinize the actions of the major players, such as China and the Philippine government, as well as the peripheral actors, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
For strategic studies professor Brahma Chellaney of New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, the event was historic for underscoring that “compliance with or defiance of international rules has no correlation with state size.” Adherence to a rules-based order is more properly linked to power dynamics and state character, he said, and state character matters more than state size.
He explained: “China’s open disdain for the award the case fought by the Philippines shows that, for China, international law matters only when it serves Chinese interest. Otherwise, international rules are bendable and even expendable.”
For Yokohama City University’s Makoto Seta, the experience revealed a problematic disjunct in the way that some member states who are party to the Unclos understand the rule of law, which should be shared.
“Japan has consistently advocated the importance of the rule of law and the use of peaceful means, not the use of force or coercion, in seeking settlement of maritime disputes,” Seta said.
Meiji University’s Go Ito agreed, adding that Tokyo had long been urging Beijing to peacefully settle the disputes in accordance to international law.
But instead, a day after The Hague decision was announced, he said, China intentionally landed two airplanes on the Mischief and Subi reefs, to him a clear indication that the Asian power was “trying to provoke the existing international order” that the arbitration award stood for.
More than the symbolic showing of defiance, “China’s assertive attitude has been jeopardizing the safety and freedom of navigation” in the important sea lane, Ito said.
A response could come in the form of looking for other like-minded partners, including the United States, to voice their support for the two-year-old decision, he added. “Countries concerned, including Japan, can look at what’s happening in the South China Sea and think about the political method of cooperation and counter measures against China.”
An environmental protection perspective in relation to the maritime area of the South China Sea could also be instrumental, he said.
Australian National University’s Natalie Sambhi, who is also a research fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre, said Australia is likewise “unequivocally committed to upholding a rules-based global order.”
The Australian foreign minister considers the arbitration award as final and binding, Sambhi said. But like Ito, the Philippines has to seek out like-minded partners in this regard.
“What I want to impress upon critically is that of the images of Filipino fishermen who seem to be battling it alone. The Philippines doesn’t have to go alone,” she said.
Gregory Poling, Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and Center for Strategic and International Studies, said China is taking advantage of the opening presented by the Duterte administration’s policy, all “while paying virtually no diplomatic price.”
“It is only using those diplomatic efforts as a delaying tactic until the day they decide to use force, or at least the threat of force to convince the Philippines and other climates to just accept as fait accompli China’s dominance on the South China Sea,” he said.
China’s unrelenting militarization of the region does not “paint a picture of a country that’s committed to finding an equitable diplomatic solution to these disputes,” Poling warned. Like others, he said China’s attitude signals a willingness to use either force or the threat of force to get its way.
This is ample and dangerous warning.
Two years after the initial momentum from the victorious decision, how does the Philippines proceed? Top of the list, as experts said, is marshalling other players to assert this rules-based order, said Dindo Manhit, President of Stratbase ADRi.
This should include the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, an informal security association of naval powers US, India, Australia, and Japan and the Asean, nearly all of which backed the 2016 decision.
“We should work with these countries to stress that connectivity ventures should be governed by a rules-based order, not fueled by predatory financing,” Manhit said.
Locally, there is a need for civil society, the academe, and the private sector to take a united stand against what is, for all intents and purposes, a defeatist attitude. Although Filipinos are generally peace-loving, another state trampling on our sovereign rights should rightly cause a stir.
In closing, Manhit said, “The Philippines is for the Filipinos to enjoy, benefit and explore. We need to truly assert our independent foreign policy and not allow others to enhance its political and economic power at our expense. We have to defend what is ours now before it is too late.”