The House of Representatives actually did it. Last week, the House voted to allot an annual budget of P1000 to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for 2017. In doing so, President Rodrigo Duterte’s political allies in the House saw to it that the president’s displeasure towards the CHR, its chairman in particular, was communicated to all and sundry in “budgetary language.”
For the past three weeks, Duterte had been lamenting what he considered a biased CHR, one which supposedly saw only the alleged faults of the Duterte administration. Duterte called the incumbent CHR chairman both a stooge of the Liberal Party and a rabid supporter of ex-President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino and her son, ex-President Benigno Aquino III.
Duterte’s dislike for the current CHR leadership seems akin to his disdain for Leila de Lima, who was CHR head before President Aquino III appointed her Secretary of Justice.
At any rate, the question that arises is this—Is the House of Representatives vested with power to allot a P1000 annual budget for the CHR for fiscal year 2017?
Before that question is answered, an overview is necessary.
The CHR is an “independent” office created under Section 17, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. As provided in the charter, the CHR is composed of a chairman and five members, and they hold office for a term fixed by law. The term “independent” means that unlike other agencies in the executive department, the official acts of the CHR cannot be reviewed or overturned by the president.
Since the creation of the CHR is mandated by the Constitution itself, Congress has no power to abolish it through legislation. Congress, however, has the power to fix the term of office of the CHR chairman and members by way of a law duly enacted, as stated in the Constitution.
It has been said that Congress has the power of “the purse” as seen in its exclusive authority to appropriate how much public money a government agency may spend. In a system of checks and balances, Congress is empowered to use the power of “the purse” precisely to check government offices which, in the well-considered view of Congress, have not been performing their duties satisfactorily.
Thus, Congress has the inherent power to decide on how much a government agency may spend every year, unless the government agency concerned is guaranteed fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.
As the term is used in the Constitution, “fiscal autonomy” means that the current annual appropriation for an agency cannot be less than the previous year’s appropriation for that same agency, and that the annual appropriation for that agency shall be automatically and regularly released.
Now for the arguments.
An editorial published last week in another newspaper denounced the budget reduction, calling it a violation of the “fiscal autonomy” the CHR is “entitled to” under Section 17, Article XIII of the Constitution. Whoever wrote that editorial should read the Constitution again.
Actually, the Constitution guarantees fiscal autonomy only to the Supreme Court, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Commission on Elections (Comelec), Commission on Audit (COA), and the Office of the Ombudsman. There is nothing in Article XIII of the Constitution which mandates the fiscal autonomy of the CHR.
The Constitution’s conspicuous guaranty of fiscal autonomy for the Supreme Court, CSC, Comelec, COA and Office of the Ombudsman, vis-a-vis the conspicuous absence of any such guaranty for the CHR, indicates that the Constitution did not intend to grant fiscal autonomy to the CHR.
Section 17(4), Article XIII of the Constitution appears to echo that observation because the provision merely reads—“the approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.” It does not prohibit the reduction of the budget of the CHR.
It is also a postulate in the construction of the language of the Constitution that “what the law does not include, it excludes.” Since the Constitution excluded the CHR from the list of offices entitled to fiscal autonomy, then no fiscal autonomy may be invoked for the CHR.
Be that as it may, in 2006, the Supreme Court categorically ruled that the CHR does not enjoy fiscal autonomy, unlike the Supreme Court, CSC, Comelec, COA and the Office of the Ombudsman.
From a constitutional perspective, it is evident that Congress has the power to reduce the annual budget of the CHR as it sees fit, much like the annual budget of other government agencies. The House has done precisely that, when it allotted a P1000 annual budget for the CHR.
At least two senators, however, have opined that by reducing the annual budget of the CHR to a ridiculously low P1000, the House has virtually abolished the CHR in violation of the Constitution.
Abolishing an office created under the Constitution is one thing. Reducing its budget is another. Difficult legal questions arise, however, when the budget of an agency created by the Constitution is reduced by Congress to an impractical amount, and P1000 is an impractical amount.
For instance, if, in the well-considered opinion of the House, a particular agency of the government which does not enjoy fiscal autonomy has not been doing its job as mandated by law, isn’t the House vested with the power, pursuant to the principle of checks and balances obtaining in the government, to check this problem through the exercise of its power of “the purse?” Of course it is.
Just how much money a particular government agency ought to be allotted for its annual budget is, undoubtedly, a prerogative of Congress. Suppose, the House changes its mind and instead of the P1000 it approved, it allots say P24 million for the CHR for 2017, will that be any different from the P1000 appropriated by the House for the CHR? What would happen if the House insists that the CHR should tighten its belt, in the same way that other agencies are required to do so?